A-Moral 'Matter'

This is a paper I wrote for a political theory course. It is essentially a criticism of the amoral political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, paying particular attention to his scientific materialist/atomist ontology. In a way, it can be viewed as a continuation of the last paper I posted on Marxism and organicism. It is an elaboration of the defining features of an atomist ontology which has largely dominated political economics (as well as philosophy, the sciences, etc) since the 17thC. Indeed, Hobbes is a prominent thinker within the early tradition of liberalism. The prevailing political/economic theories accepted today stem from these roots of thought. Thus, we are acquainted with the term neo-liberalism. Without doubt, the fundamental assumptions put forth by Hobbes regarding the nature of being and human being in particular are fairly important for anyone considering modern capitalist ideology. This remains to be the case even though Hobbes' conclusion of the absolute sovereign will be rejected by the following tradition of liberalism. The underlying view of human beings as self-seeking utility-maximizing machines will remain a central theme of modern economics - a view which is antithetical to a moralistic approach.



Hobbes’ Leviathan contains a highly systematic and scientific treatment of human nature and human relations which serves to legitimize an amoral mode of political organization characterized by the rule of an absolute sovereign. Hobbes begins the Leviathan by setting forth an ontology of scientific materialism which will guide him in his method of investigation and, consequentially, in his assumptions concerning the nature of human beings. A scientific materialist ontological framework presupposes that all being consists of bits of atomic matter in constant motion. Therefore, human beings are understood by Hobbes to be complex, yet atomic, systems of matter in motion propelled by our appetites and aversions. This provides no room to conceive of interdependence, purposiveness or the existence of an objective good. Hobbes deduces a hypothetical picture of our state of nature from these assumed fundamental axioms of human character. He asserts that humans would be prone to pulverize each other, paradoxically stemming from our desire for self-preservation and continued motion.

Political organization, according to Hobbes, must be primarily concerned with the preservation of our species by way of protecting all self-seeking individuals from their self-seeking neighbours. This requires an absolute sovereign who represents force and violence in order to direct the continued motion of the masses for their own protection. Notions of higher human potential and essence which may provide a basis for a moral conception of political organizagtion are not only excluded from this particular ontological framework, Hobbes addresses them as being absurd and even dangerous to our continued existence. In this paper, the influence of Hobbes’ ontology on his ideas of human being and political power will be critically explored in light of the view that our political organization ought to have a moral basis. Hobbes’ underlying assumptions will be contrasted with a radically different set of assumptions derivable from an alternative ontology of organicism - the notion of organic interdependence. An organicist ontology will be represented through some key ideas in the ancient political philosophy of Aristotle which treat human beings as potentially capable of living a eudaemonic life through the developed capabilities and virtues made possible by our faculty of reason. Political organization can be regarded here as having the moral objective of allowing humans to actualize the good life. Important problems with Aristotle’s method will also be brought to light and considered. However, the main ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions put forth by Aristotle will be presented as a positive alternative to the authoritarian and amoral conclusions of Hobbes.

It makes most sense to begin by elucidating the central tenants and implications of a scientific materialist ontology through an examination of Hobbes’ methodology and other early evidence of his ontological assumptions. Hobbes relies on the investigative model of geometry in his exploration into human relations. This style of mathematical investigation favours axiomatic deductive reasoning. Thus, when applied to human phenomena, this method implicitly suggests that all living reality contains a static character which is deducible and calculable as such. Indeed, for Hobbes, the only thing that exists to be taken into scientific account is a relative and subjective concrete material reality. Notions of 'good' and 'bad' or 'true' and 'false' are only the result of names which we ascribe to our outside reality. There is no inherent and objective truth or goodness contained in the universe. Thus, the truth which we are given through geometry rests upon the proper use and calculation of names which adequately represent material reality. Universality is only a characteristic of agreed definitions which register similarity between things in our material world. Artificially constructed language is a tool capable of removing ourselves from immediacy in order to gain recognition of universals. Beyond this, there is no truth and, consequently, there is no purposiveness in the movement of life. So far, this ontological scheme has been shown to view all reality as being made up of bits of matter with no room for ideas concerning 'essence' or 'purpose.' Indeed, Hobbes explicitly addressees such notions as being grounded in absurdity. Such absurdity is said to stem from the use of what he calls 'senseless speech.' That is, words that do not represent concrete material phenomena, such as the idea of a 'free will' which implies a freedom outside of its negative sense as unhindered motion. Hobbes attacks Aristotelean philosophy for the use of absurd speech which wrongfully signifies entities or forces which exist outside of our material reality.

For Hobbes, reality consists of nothing other than matter in motion. He describes a very mechanical conception of the human being in which '. . .life is but a motion of limbs.' Here we arrive at another key tenant of a scientific materialist ontology - external relations. External relations implies that the character of a given entity remains separate and non-dependent from its relations with other isolated bodies. Hobbes goes on in the same passage to describe the human heart as a spring, our nerves as strings and so on. There is no conception of interdependence through which we can picture the heart as being a heart in virtue of its relation to the nerves and vice versa. Thus, Hobbes describes political systems as being artificially created as opposed to attributing their existence to an organic growth resulting from an interdependence of factors in a living universe. Thus, the ontological framework of scientific materialism accepted by Hobbes conceives reality as constituted by isolated bits of moving matter in external relations with no higher good or interdependence. This has an important influence on his conception of the nature of human beings.Following the conception of reality set forth by a scientific materialist ontology, human beings are conceived by Hobbes to be nothing more than intricate and mechanical systems of matter in motion. Human beings are supposedly governed by a law of eternal motion which applies to all physical reality. Hobbes raises a picture in our minds of those familiar rolling waves which move across a body of water long after their principal source of motion (the wind) has died out. He then goes on to compare this evidence of continued motion with the internal motions which take place inside humans. Hobbes describes these internal motions as beginning with the operation of the senses in relation to the external world of objects and culminating in our voluntary motion. The process begins when our immediate senses become manifest as imagination or memory - sense which has 'decayed.' Such imagination will form our general desires and endeavours, expressed in the form of appetites and aversions. For Hobbes, this marks the origin of human emotions. Those things we are said to 'love' or 'hate' are simply expressions of our relative appetites or aversions which stem from our sensory experiences and the motions of imagination. Hobbes’ scheme of thought leaves no room to conceive of emotions as feelings which are consistent with our proximity to an objective good in our activities.

For Hobbes, our faculty of reason is regarded as a calculative device which is governed by the demands of our passions and desires. Hobbes speaks of reason as an acquired wit which is developed by our passions, namely the desire for power. Power, Hobbes says, is the '. . . present means to obtain some future apparent good. . .' Essentially, humans are liable to exercise their calculative faculty of reason when motivated by subjective desires created by their random mechanical interactions with other bits of matter in motion. Hobbes explains: '. . . thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and find the way to things desired . . .' The final stage of internal motion before the emergence of voluntary action is the culmination of a will. The human will is produced after one takes part in a process of deliberation which narrows down and restricts all of the different options produced by our desires. Hobbes concludes from this mechanical view of humankind that the happiness and well being of any given human depends on their relative capability to satisfy all of their different desires through rational deliberation. He continues to explicitly denounce the notion of a mind completely contented. This type of satisfaction of our desires would bring an end to our continued motion which, for Hobbes, would imply an absence of life all together. Therefore, there is no room for the idea of objectively good activities which are an end in themselves. Our voluntary motions are such that they seek an endless movement from one instrumental good to the next. Further, we seek not only immediate pleasure but are largely driven by a view to the future which urges us to ensure our continual pleasure through the fulfillment of our appetites. From these premises Hobbes will claim that the human character is marked by '. . . a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.' This picture of the nature of human individuals has enormous implications for Hobbes’ conception of the types of relations which are 'natural' among human beings. This will be expressed in his idea of a hypothetical state of nature.

Following his scientific method of investigation, Hobbes has broken down the various elements of human life into fixed and calculable axioms. A notion of our state of nature is deduced from these assumed axioms pertaining to our innate character. How would these complex human 'atoms' interact without what Hobbes views as the artificial construct of political power and civil society? According to Hobbes, if all self-seeking individuals are continually moved by a desire for 'power after power' with no complete satisfaction available, we would eventually be prone to engage in competitive relations in order to ensure our own future pleasures. Therefore, individuals will become inclined to wish dominance over other human beings and this will find its ultimate expression in the act of murder. An individual’s power is seen by Hobbes to be entirely relative to the power of others. There is no room to conceive of an interdependence of power where my abilities are the precondition for your abilities. Instead, Hobbes paints a picture of violent atomic clashes taking place between human beings. Further, since we are all equally endowed with the means to take another persons life, we all necessarily become equally inclined to pursue this path of violence. Thus, when two violently inclined individuals find themselves head to head in their pursuits of an apparent good, self-preservation dictates an act of defensive murder on both parts. Given that such circumstances arise, every person will have an equal and legitimate reason to assume that their neighbours are plotting their murder for their own self-gain and continued motion. Thus, our calculative faculty of reason will lead us to a sort of irrational rationality which puts forth the logical option of pre-emptive violence for our own preservation. Such a rationale is termed here as being irrational for the reason that it will definitely continue a cycle of violence which will ensure our own vulnerability to a greater degree.

Hobbes refers to our natural state of existence as a state of war. Even if some people may be content with a limited amount of power, it becomes reasonable for all people to engage in violent impositions due to the fact that some individuals are inclined to pursue power past their own preservation. Hobbes also cites glory as a motive contributing to the state of war, stemming from our desire to be recognized as powerful in our respective communities. The state of war which Hobbes describes is not to be mistaken as an everlasting bloody physical battle ensuing twenty four hours each day and seven days a week. Instead, he refers to a mode of existence which is characterized by a persistent looming fear and threat of violence attached to all of our activities. Further, the sate of war is a realm of existence within which all humans possess the natural right to use their own power however they please for their own preservation and continued motion. Hobbes asserts that, in this natural state of nature, freedom consists in the open and free movement of our capability to continue seeking power by any means suggested by our own individual reason. This is a paradoxical idea of freedom in which our 'free activities' will actually contribute toward our own insecurities through the building up of outside threats. Faced with this conundrum, our collective calculative reason will produce what Hobbes calls general laws of nature. These laws stem from our fundamental desire for self-preservation. The most important of these laws are: one, that we are always seeking peace and two, that we are liable to let go of our paradoxical freedoms toward the creation of peace only when others are inclined to do the same. Hobbes has very cleverly deduced a hypothetical state of natural relations which begs desperately for a way out. How can us self-seeking and perpetually power hungry creatures organize ourselves in order to ensure our own survival? Especially given the fact that: 'The force of words. . .[is] too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants.' Hobbes will answer this dilemma with his idea of the amoral absolute sovereign power.

Hobbes asserts that the only viable situation of mutual contract for every person’s self-preservation is one enforced by the security provided in a commonwealth lead by an absolute sovereign. His answer to the questions begged by our hypothetical state of nature will include the idea that '. . .covenants without the sword are but words. . .' The fundamental notion being expressed here is that a truly binding and obliging contract which represents our rational will for peace is enforceable only by means of fear. Hobbes’ legitimization of an amoral foundation of political power is expressed quite clearly in his attempt to define a truly 'moral' philosophy. What is moral is said to be rooted in a knowledge of the laws of nature. Since ideas of 'good' and 'evil' are relative words meant to signify our passions, their only objective value is realized in the universal desire of self-preservation. This will lead Hobbes to conclude that whatever shall serve the function of our preservation ought to be regarded as being 'good' whereas whatever seems to threaten our continued motion is by virtue of that fact 'evil.' This will become a justification for the absolute legislative power of a sovereign to direct the motion of the masses for their own 'good.' Moreover, notions which support the idea of a higher moral purpose attached to the essence of humans will be discredited as being dangerous to our preservation. Such ideas are regarded as being dangerous for the reason that they appear to undermine the overarching rule of an absolute sovereign in favour of private virtues. Stemming from an ontological framework which is confined to seeing humans as fixed axioms characterized by their relentless self-seeking motion, any faith in an individual’s developed moral virtues would be disastrous. Therefore, the only possible unity which can arise amongst such beings is established through the bonds of mutual fear created in a commonwealth.

The passion of fear is an essential quality of security for Hobbes because it alone forces people to sacrifice the paradoxical freedoms enjoyed in the state of nature. Hobbes describes two ways in which fear will lead to the creation of a commonwealth lead by a sovereign power. The commonwealth created by institution is one that arises as a result of the people voluntarily entering into a contract in order to consolidate power into the hands of a sovereign due to an unbearable fear of each other in the state of nature. The second and more common situation is the commonwealth which is established through acquisition - the sovereign power acquires rule over a body of people by virtue of violent force. Absolute power becomes legitimate in the second situation due to the population’s fear of the sovereign themself. In both cases, the submission of a population to an absolute power is the source of obligation for that population to follow all of the rules established by that power. The people must give up all of their natural freedoms. Hobbes justifies this type of absolute power by highlighting the continual fear accompanying humankind of slipping back into that state of nature which proves to be far worse than any despotic power could ever be. Hobbes asserts: '. . .of so unlimited a power men may fancy of many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse.' Therefore, the principle aim of political power according to Hobbes is to utilize the passion of fear in all humans in order to direct their motion in a manner which is most conducive to their security and preservation. The commonwealth is not an organic growth but rather a human construction through which our fake chains gain strength only with the real possibility of violent punishment. In an ultimate expression of materialism, Hobbes describes humans as the matter of a commonwealth of which the sovereign is the architect. There is no space provided within Hobbes’ scheme of thought to understand political organization as containing a moral objective which extends beyond the provision of security for mere life. Perhaps this position is the truly dangerous one when compared with a set of assumptions which allows us to see humans in their interdependence and higher potentials - an ontology of organicism. An oranicist ontological framework will be explained through an examination of its expression in the political philosophy of Aristotle. The notion of organic interdependence finds obvious expression in Aristotle’s teleological view of reality. Where all entities are interrelated, it is possible to notice things in their growth and development. Thus, some things can be regarded as instrumental goods in a long chain of interconnections moving toward goods which are an ends in themself. According to this scheme, reality can be viewed as containing elements of growth, purpose and the existence of an objective good. The objective good consists in the most self-sufficient ends of any given activity - it is the telos. Aristotle says, '. . .the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.' This organic conception of reality which imbues all things with purpose and growth will have significant implications for Aristotle’s understanding of the nature of human beings.

For Aristotle, the ends of all human activity is the objective good of 'happiness'- roughly translated from the word eudaemonia which implies a feeling of complete contentment and fulfillment. Eudaemonia is understood to be the highest good of our activities because it is a completely self-sufficient ends. It is a feeling to which we would undoubtably say 'stay.' For Aristotle, there is such a thing as a mind fully satisfied. This state of mind is reached only through the exorcize of our unique faculty of reason which allows us to access such universal truths. Aristotle defines the highest feeling of eudaemonia as being a result of the 'activity of soul in accordance with virtue. . .' The instinctual passions of the body discussed by Hobbes which lead us to endevour external and relativist goods are seen by Aristotle as merely instrumental means to our highest desire of the goods of the soul. This highly elusive sounding idea of the goods of the soul is described by Aristotle quite clearly in the following passage: 'You can see for yourselves that the happy life . . . belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul.' According to Aristotle, we are capable of developing universally valid virtues which can guide our desires in a fashion most conducive to the realization of a eudaemonic life. This conception of human nature stands in stark contrast with the Hobbesian notion of an innate and static human character whose faculty of reason serves only to calculate our instinctual passions. Likewise, Aristotle will produce a radically different idea of human relations.

Aristotle imagines three different modes of human relations or 'friendships' which may arise between individuals in society. It is important to note that Aristotle does not develop a hypothetical notion of our relations in a so called 'state of nature' like Hobbes. For Aristotle, the individual is a product of their social existence and is not conceivable outside of the organic growth of a society. Aristotle asserts that '. . .the whole is necessarily prior to the part.' This means that the individual gains their human character only within the whole of society. Therefore, our relations are constitutional of our development and growth. Aristotle defines a friendship as a reciprocal relation which is built upon one of the three goods of utility, pleasure or virtue. The truest and highest form of friendship is understood to be one based on a foundation of shared virtues. This type of relation will sustain time and will be based on a sense of goodwill which is an end in itself, as opposed to those relations which are instrumental and exploitative. Both individuals will recognize the other’s genuine striving toward the good and both will become the condition for the other’s capability to live a life filled with activities of goodness. Aristotle says, '. . .in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.' Therefore, human beings are capable of entering into relations which are productive of the highest good of eudaemonia as opposed to the Hobbesian view that we are always dangerous fetters to each others pursuits and physical existence. Thus, for Aristotle, political organization will be seen as containing the moral objective of providing individuals with the space to develop truly good relations and a life of goodness.

Aristotle’s moral conception of political order stems from his organicist ontological assumptions which lead him to see things in their organic interdependence and growth. The polis is regarded as a naturally evolving form of association which corresponds to our essence as potentially reasonable creatures. Aristotle asserts that '. . .while it [the polis] comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the sake of a good life.' The full development of the virtues associated with truly good activities presupposes an arena of rational deliberation which is provided by the state. Indeed, Aristotle agues that political association is a central tenant to our humanity because it alone allows us to exercise our unique faculty of reason. It allows us to reach our telos. Thus, the political arena is the highest and most self-sufficient ends of all our associations as human beings. From these premises regarding the nature of man and the function of political organization, we are presented with one of Aristotle’s most famous assertions that '. . .man is a political animal. . .' It is only through political activity that we are able to enact our higher potential of living the objective good life. Therefore, Aristotle prescribes a primarily moral function to human political orders - the ethical and the political are intimately linked. Aristotle asserts that the best constitution ought to ensure the best way of life. In other words, the primary concern of a state must center around the provision of individuals with the material and spiritual means to live a life of goodness. Since our happiness and fulfillment is gained through activities of virtue, the state is to be seen first and foremost as an agent of virtue. This is evident in Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of the state in providing proper education in order to train our reason and to 'cultivate the whole of excellence.' Aristotle’s ontological and political conceptions offer a moral alternative to Hobbes’ amoral system of an absolute sovereign conducting the motion of human matter.

There are important consequences involved in Aristotle’s political philosophy which also ought to be considered. It shall not be left off as though Aristotle presents a flawless and wholly moral philosophy. On the contrary, Aristotle’s teleological understanding of human association serves in many places as a justification for the oppressive institutions of slavery and patriarchy. Since all entities occupy a position in an interdependent growth, some forms of being are conceptually restricted to exist as the instrumental means for higher and more inclusive ends. This is exactly the case in terms of Aristotle’s support for human relations of dominance and exploitation. Since the polis is the highest ends of association, the household roles of slaves and women become regarded as a means for the good life of those few citizens who are privileged enough to take part in political affairs. Aristotle explains that an 'article of property is . . .an instrument for the purpose of life' and that '. . .the slave is an animate article of property. . .' Indeed, for Aristotle, an interconnected reality involves ruling and ruled entities in a teleological movement. By virtue of this fact, Aristotle will claim that the man is naturally superior to the woman. Somewhat like the slave, the wife occupies a subordinate role in the management of a household which is an instrumental association toward the development of a polis.

Although Aristotle’s moral politics paradoxically support a set of justifications for the immoral institutions of slavery and patriarchy, his key ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions can be sublated as a response to Hobbes’ scientific materialist authoritarianism. The fundamental ideas of organic interdependence and an objective and knowable good which is potentially realizable by human beings can be preserved as the basis of a truly moral politics. For instance, Aristotle’s idea of true friendship contains very progressive and democratic tendencies to which we can lend our focus. Indeed, if we recognize that the potential for activities of the soul in accordance with virtue exists within every human being, relations of domination and exploitation would be wholly negated in favour of those reciprocal relations of virtue which are productive of a eudaemonic existence. Instead of being meaningless bits of matter which ought to be manipulated through fear, humans can be regarded as dynamic and purposeful beings which ought to be organized in light of our higher essence - to live a '. . .life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in activities of goodness.'

References
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics http://www.classics.mit.edu/aristotle/nicomachean.1.i.html
Aristotle Politics
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
Asher Horowitz Political Science 2900 Lectures. York University
Ted Winslow Social Science 3552 Lectures. York University

Historical Development and Moral Political Economy

The following is a short inquiry and exploration into the topic of human development and the connected possibilities of a truly moral political/economic structure. "Moral" here implies a certain conception of the nature of human beings as potentially rational beings capable of leading a life filled with fully free and fulfilling activities presupposing their full development. What proceeds is an account of human development put forth in the philosophy of Karl Marx with particular attention paid to the ontological framework which he adopts. In the introduction I use the phrase "ancient linage" to describe the roots of these ontological assumptions. By this I am referring to the ancient Greek tradition of thought and in particular to the works of Aristotle who Marx hailed as "the greatest thinker of antiquity."




Marx conceives political economy as a moral science which contains the primary concern of providing individuals with the requirements necessary in order to live the objective good life. The ideas expounded by Marx in his conception of political economy as a moral science have an ancient lineage and can be shown as having their roots in a particular set of ontological assumptions known as organicism. An organicist ontology conceives being as constituted by activities in internal relations. The philosophic anthropological implications of an ontology of organicism allows room for the elements of self-determination and final causation to be applied to human activity. Human being is regarded as a potentially rational being. This can be seen in Marx’s ability to view the individual as an active agent capable of enacting their potential as a fully rational and therefore free being through an historical process of education. For Marx, this process of the development of human reason takes place within our economic structure, which constitutes what he refers to as the base. Marx asserts that the base is the prime source of our development and so it directly effects the types of relations which will characterize what he terms as the superstructure. The term superstructure is used by Marx to describe the larger structure of society and its institutions (politics, religion, art, etc). In this essay, an examination of the main tenants of organicism and its philosophic anthropological implications will provide the basis for an examination of Marx’s emphasis on the base as the main stage of human relations and development. This will provide the background necessary to elaborate exactly how, for Marx, individuals can come to know and actualize the good life in a fully free superstructure.

According to an organicist ontology, the given character of any being is formed by its active appropriation of those things which it is related to. In terms of understanding the nature of human being, this is expressed by Marx in the following way: "In its reality it (the essence of man) is the ensemble of social relationships." Human character is not treated as something innate and unchangeable. Instead, an individual’s character is regarded as the outcome of the particular relations in which that individual is embedded. From this position we are able to view human actions as potentially self-determined. The scope of self-determined activity is indeed conditioned and somewhat limited by the set of relations which form the individual’s essence. Nevertheless, according to this scheme, actions are far from being pre-determined by some concrete set of relations. The relations which condition actions are themselves subject to change throughout history as the result of human activity. Moreover, according to the set of philosophic anthropological assumptions which derive from organicism, human being is understood as a potentially rational being. This expresses the possibility of a self-determination being grounded in reason, which would result in wholly rational and truly good actions. Indeed, such claims presuppose the existence of an objective and rational good as a final cause. For Marx, the objective good is detailed in his notion of the true realm of freedom which we will explore later. For now, what is most important is the conception of human being as, in one sense, the result of internal relations and in another sense a potentially rational being who is capable of knowing and actualizing the good life. Marx envisions an historical process of education and development toward the creation of ideal relations which provide what Alfred Whitehead refers to as the real potentiality for actualizing the good. However, before we consider this process of development, it is necessary to first explore the principle source of this development - the base.

For Marx, the base encompasses both relations and forces of production. Humans are regarded as natural producers owing to the fact that activity within the realm of necessity provides us with the essential means of life itself. Therefore, the relations which arise from the activities of production and exchange are primal and unavoidable. Moreover, the act of production is regarded as an objectification of mind. In this sense, the forces of production are reflective of the development of reason. From this position we can reach the conclusion that the very essence of human being, which we now know is measured by our level of rationality, is determined by our relations within the base. Relations of production are intimately connected with the development of reason and can be seen as a gage for the level of freedom or rationality which exists. Kosik expresses Marx’s conception of the base as the main stage of the development of human essence in the following words: ". . .economics appears as the conjunction of human relations and the source of human reality." This puts forth the implicit suggestion that the relations which characterize the base directly effect the level of rationality in the superstructure. Forces and relations of production do not only provide the material necessities of life but are also directly developmental of human reason.

It is important to emphasize that, for Marx, the base is nothing other than a human creation itself. In other words, his emphasis on the base as a center of human development does not amount to an economic determinist position. Internal relations at the base merely condition the scope of an individuals self-determined actions. It is only through human activity that relations are transformed and new conditions are created which can be closer to our ends of freedom. The progression toward relations of freedom, which are central to Marx’s notion of the objective good, is understood as an interdependent movement of freedom and reason. The true realm of freedom would be a superstructure comprised of fully reasonable and rational individuals who posses the developed capabilities necessary to share in good activities. Such activities would provide the content for relations of mutual recognition and freedom.
Marx’s notion of the objective good paints a clear picture of the correlation between reason and freedom. The next step will be to explain exactly how, for Marx, the progressive development of reason and relations takes place.

Marx envisions an historical process of education taking place within the base which unfolds in stages as part of a dialectic. The capitalist system of production is conceived by Marx as being the final stage in a dialectical movement toward the true realm of freedom. Relations within the capitalist mode of production are presented as being antithetical to the actualization of the individual’s essence as a potentially rational being. This means that instead of being characterized by actions which have a rational basis, the capitalist character is primarily dominated by irrational motives. Marx’s notion of irrational motivation appropriates Hegel’s idea of the passions. The passions are described by Hegel as self-interested and un-fulfilling motives which are the outcome of less than rational relations. Marx details his notion of the capitalist passions as consisting of an irrational desire for the instrumental good of money as an ends - greed. This mistaken pursuit of an instrumental good as an ends is not founded on knowledge of the rational objective good and therefore it fosters relations which are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Paradoxically, the development of reason which would negate these irrational capitalist relations is understood by Marx as a result of those relations themselves. Marx appropriates this notion of a dialectical development of freedom from Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relation. Hegel suggests that the relation of domination and submission between master and slave is positively developmental for the slave.

"The complete, absolutely free man, . . . completely satisfied by what he is . . . will be the Slave who has overcome slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress"

For Hegel, the slave is able to form, through their labour, a higher state of consciousness and reason involving a view to the future. Where the master is only capable of enjoying the goods of the slave’s production subjectively, the slave undergoes a development of reason through which they are able to conceive an objective good. Likewise, Marx regards the irrational relations of capitalist production as capable of developing a consciousness in the mind of the worker which brings them closer to rationality and the ability to act in accordance with an objective good. Thus, the worker as a subject of irrational capitalist motives develops the capabilities necessary to end their subjection. Such fully developed individuals would be capable of enacting their potential as rational free beings and would therefore live within the ideal relations of freedom constitutive of a fully free superstructure. Marx asserts that a society of fully rational individuals would bring the realm of necessity under their own collective control in order to reduce the hours spent working within it and to maximize the amount of time spent acting within the realm of freedom.

In this paper, Marx’s notion of the base-superstructure relation has been presented in light of the organicist ontology from which his moral political economy derives. These ideas have been expounded in quite general terms when considered in relation to the extensive possibilities of inquiry on the subject. Therefore, it would be rather naive to present a definite conclusion to the concepts discussed so far. Instead, it seems most appropriate to put forth the next possible area of inquiry which may arise from considering the ideas presented in this paper. For instance, the question can be legitimately posed as to why we are still stuck within a form of capitalist organization despite Marx’s assertion that early capitalist relations were a mere gradation in a progressive movement toward freedom. This question leads us to consider the ontology dominant in our modern times, which is one of atomism. According to the atomist scheme of thought, there is no room for self-determination or the existence of an objective good. Perhaps these ontological assumptions ought to be reevaluated.


References
Ted Winslow. Marx on the Relation between "Justice", "Freedom" and "Capabilities"
Ted Winslow. Atomism and Organicism
Ted Winslow. Ontology and Political Economy
Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1969)
Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach
Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

Purpose

First post. First blog.

I suppose it makes sense to begin with a short explanation of my blogspot name. This will be most fitting because a) it is a somewhat unique title to choose to which there is an ancient and philosophical background and b) because it will be an underlying theme running through all of my posts.

Minerva is the name of an ancient Roman goddess of wisdom. She was accompanied in her journeys by and Owl which consequently represents wisdom or the spirit from which the endeavour of philosophy (translated from Greek to mean 'love of wisdom) takes flight.

The 19th Century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel makes reference to the Owl of Minerva in his 'Preface to The Philosophy of Right.' Hegel says: "The Owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk" By this he means that the culminating wisdom of an historical epoch is gained in hindsight - at dusk - before a new epoch arises.

In a sense, my posts will generally follow the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom in line with the spirit suggested by the flight of Minerva's Owl. However, it will be a pursuit accompanied by high hopes that we may gain a clue as to how we ought to conduct ourselves as human beings in a manner most conducive to our highest potentials today. Perhaps, the flight of enlightenment and truth may one day take off and soar before our eyes - before dusk.

Let us take an adventure into the realm of ideas, willing always that they may also become manifest as progressive actions.