Historical Development and Moral Political Economy

The following is a short inquiry and exploration into the topic of human development and the connected possibilities of a truly moral political/economic structure. "Moral" here implies a certain conception of the nature of human beings as potentially rational beings capable of leading a life filled with fully free and fulfilling activities presupposing their full development. What proceeds is an account of human development put forth in the philosophy of Karl Marx with particular attention paid to the ontological framework which he adopts. In the introduction I use the phrase "ancient linage" to describe the roots of these ontological assumptions. By this I am referring to the ancient Greek tradition of thought and in particular to the works of Aristotle who Marx hailed as "the greatest thinker of antiquity."




Marx conceives political economy as a moral science which contains the primary concern of providing individuals with the requirements necessary in order to live the objective good life. The ideas expounded by Marx in his conception of political economy as a moral science have an ancient lineage and can be shown as having their roots in a particular set of ontological assumptions known as organicism. An organicist ontology conceives being as constituted by activities in internal relations. The philosophic anthropological implications of an ontology of organicism allows room for the elements of self-determination and final causation to be applied to human activity. Human being is regarded as a potentially rational being. This can be seen in Marx’s ability to view the individual as an active agent capable of enacting their potential as a fully rational and therefore free being through an historical process of education. For Marx, this process of the development of human reason takes place within our economic structure, which constitutes what he refers to as the base. Marx asserts that the base is the prime source of our development and so it directly effects the types of relations which will characterize what he terms as the superstructure. The term superstructure is used by Marx to describe the larger structure of society and its institutions (politics, religion, art, etc). In this essay, an examination of the main tenants of organicism and its philosophic anthropological implications will provide the basis for an examination of Marx’s emphasis on the base as the main stage of human relations and development. This will provide the background necessary to elaborate exactly how, for Marx, individuals can come to know and actualize the good life in a fully free superstructure.

According to an organicist ontology, the given character of any being is formed by its active appropriation of those things which it is related to. In terms of understanding the nature of human being, this is expressed by Marx in the following way: "In its reality it (the essence of man) is the ensemble of social relationships." Human character is not treated as something innate and unchangeable. Instead, an individual’s character is regarded as the outcome of the particular relations in which that individual is embedded. From this position we are able to view human actions as potentially self-determined. The scope of self-determined activity is indeed conditioned and somewhat limited by the set of relations which form the individual’s essence. Nevertheless, according to this scheme, actions are far from being pre-determined by some concrete set of relations. The relations which condition actions are themselves subject to change throughout history as the result of human activity. Moreover, according to the set of philosophic anthropological assumptions which derive from organicism, human being is understood as a potentially rational being. This expresses the possibility of a self-determination being grounded in reason, which would result in wholly rational and truly good actions. Indeed, such claims presuppose the existence of an objective and rational good as a final cause. For Marx, the objective good is detailed in his notion of the true realm of freedom which we will explore later. For now, what is most important is the conception of human being as, in one sense, the result of internal relations and in another sense a potentially rational being who is capable of knowing and actualizing the good life. Marx envisions an historical process of education and development toward the creation of ideal relations which provide what Alfred Whitehead refers to as the real potentiality for actualizing the good. However, before we consider this process of development, it is necessary to first explore the principle source of this development - the base.

For Marx, the base encompasses both relations and forces of production. Humans are regarded as natural producers owing to the fact that activity within the realm of necessity provides us with the essential means of life itself. Therefore, the relations which arise from the activities of production and exchange are primal and unavoidable. Moreover, the act of production is regarded as an objectification of mind. In this sense, the forces of production are reflective of the development of reason. From this position we can reach the conclusion that the very essence of human being, which we now know is measured by our level of rationality, is determined by our relations within the base. Relations of production are intimately connected with the development of reason and can be seen as a gage for the level of freedom or rationality which exists. Kosik expresses Marx’s conception of the base as the main stage of the development of human essence in the following words: ". . .economics appears as the conjunction of human relations and the source of human reality." This puts forth the implicit suggestion that the relations which characterize the base directly effect the level of rationality in the superstructure. Forces and relations of production do not only provide the material necessities of life but are also directly developmental of human reason.

It is important to emphasize that, for Marx, the base is nothing other than a human creation itself. In other words, his emphasis on the base as a center of human development does not amount to an economic determinist position. Internal relations at the base merely condition the scope of an individuals self-determined actions. It is only through human activity that relations are transformed and new conditions are created which can be closer to our ends of freedom. The progression toward relations of freedom, which are central to Marx’s notion of the objective good, is understood as an interdependent movement of freedom and reason. The true realm of freedom would be a superstructure comprised of fully reasonable and rational individuals who posses the developed capabilities necessary to share in good activities. Such activities would provide the content for relations of mutual recognition and freedom.
Marx’s notion of the objective good paints a clear picture of the correlation between reason and freedom. The next step will be to explain exactly how, for Marx, the progressive development of reason and relations takes place.

Marx envisions an historical process of education taking place within the base which unfolds in stages as part of a dialectic. The capitalist system of production is conceived by Marx as being the final stage in a dialectical movement toward the true realm of freedom. Relations within the capitalist mode of production are presented as being antithetical to the actualization of the individual’s essence as a potentially rational being. This means that instead of being characterized by actions which have a rational basis, the capitalist character is primarily dominated by irrational motives. Marx’s notion of irrational motivation appropriates Hegel’s idea of the passions. The passions are described by Hegel as self-interested and un-fulfilling motives which are the outcome of less than rational relations. Marx details his notion of the capitalist passions as consisting of an irrational desire for the instrumental good of money as an ends - greed. This mistaken pursuit of an instrumental good as an ends is not founded on knowledge of the rational objective good and therefore it fosters relations which are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Paradoxically, the development of reason which would negate these irrational capitalist relations is understood by Marx as a result of those relations themselves. Marx appropriates this notion of a dialectical development of freedom from Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relation. Hegel suggests that the relation of domination and submission between master and slave is positively developmental for the slave.

"The complete, absolutely free man, . . . completely satisfied by what he is . . . will be the Slave who has overcome slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress"

For Hegel, the slave is able to form, through their labour, a higher state of consciousness and reason involving a view to the future. Where the master is only capable of enjoying the goods of the slave’s production subjectively, the slave undergoes a development of reason through which they are able to conceive an objective good. Likewise, Marx regards the irrational relations of capitalist production as capable of developing a consciousness in the mind of the worker which brings them closer to rationality and the ability to act in accordance with an objective good. Thus, the worker as a subject of irrational capitalist motives develops the capabilities necessary to end their subjection. Such fully developed individuals would be capable of enacting their potential as rational free beings and would therefore live within the ideal relations of freedom constitutive of a fully free superstructure. Marx asserts that a society of fully rational individuals would bring the realm of necessity under their own collective control in order to reduce the hours spent working within it and to maximize the amount of time spent acting within the realm of freedom.

In this paper, Marx’s notion of the base-superstructure relation has been presented in light of the organicist ontology from which his moral political economy derives. These ideas have been expounded in quite general terms when considered in relation to the extensive possibilities of inquiry on the subject. Therefore, it would be rather naive to present a definite conclusion to the concepts discussed so far. Instead, it seems most appropriate to put forth the next possible area of inquiry which may arise from considering the ideas presented in this paper. For instance, the question can be legitimately posed as to why we are still stuck within a form of capitalist organization despite Marx’s assertion that early capitalist relations were a mere gradation in a progressive movement toward freedom. This question leads us to consider the ontology dominant in our modern times, which is one of atomism. According to the atomist scheme of thought, there is no room for self-determination or the existence of an objective good. Perhaps these ontological assumptions ought to be reevaluated.


References
Ted Winslow. Marx on the Relation between "Justice", "Freedom" and "Capabilities"
Ted Winslow. Atomism and Organicism
Ted Winslow. Ontology and Political Economy
Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1969)
Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach
Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts