Based on the assumption that war and violent domination do not designate a desirable state of human affairs, this paper will maintain an uncompromising revolutionary position concerning the construction of a world which ought to be. The ideological foundation underpinning this assertion of the "ought" rests on the notion that global and interpersonal cooperation provides the solid ground required for an absolutely free and positively creative existence which corresponds to our essential human needs. Thus, anything short of a free and egalitarian order within local communities and on an international level is unacceptable. Of course, this militant socialist assertion of freedom and equality is commonly discounted as utopian and impractical. The impracticability of this position is often evidenced by the brutal failure of the Soviet Union as a "socialist project " and the subsequent failure of Marxist ideology. Admittedly, Marxist-Leninist and various neo-Marxist positions are common ideological slants among those who argue for revolutionary change. However, these positions do not represent a universal norm encompassing all revolutionary socialist tendencies.
In terms of revolutionary Russia, it is important to note that there were various ideologies of socialism consolidating as active political forces apart from Lenin’s Red Bolshevik party. In this paper, the revolutionary force of the Ukrainian Makhnovist anarchist resistence will be explored as a radical alternative to the Bolshevik system. Further, it will be argued that the anarchist communist program of the Makhnovist movement is representative of the true goals and the real essence of a viable revolutionary socialist transformation. Certainly, the strongest criticism of a Makhnovist anarchist framework can be found within the realist position. Thus, in this paper, the principles of a Makhnovist revolutionary anarchist approach will face the ruthless criticism of a realist perspective which will beg the important question: in an inherently imperfect world, how would the anarchist ideals of the Makhnovists amount to anything other than the same ultimate failure faced by Bolshevism? Rest assured, however, that a revolutionary anarchist communist platform will emerge unscathed from this challenge.
In order to elucidate the central tenants of the Makhnovist revolutionary position, it is necessary to begin by detailing the historical emergence of this movement. In March 1918, only five months after Lenin’s successful Bolshevik revolution, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed by Bolshevik power which allowed Germany and Austria-hungry to seize control of the Ukraine. It was out of this context that a force of resistence consolidated which was propelled by the guidance and revolutionary spirit of anarchist Nestor Makhno. This force of resistence, known under the title of the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine, was an anarchist communist peasant army which was successful in forcing out German and Austria-Hungarian occupation and the accompanying Hetmen authorities.
Following the defeat of occupying Central Powers, Makhnovist forces were hurled into another bloody struggle against two invading factions engaged in the Russian civil war, namely, Denikin’s traditionalist White army and Lenin’s Bolshevik Red army. While at times allying with the Red army due to their common struggle against Denikin’s White army, the Makhnovists engaged in a struggle of independence against Lenin’s invading Red army. Indeed, the goals, principles and prime political objectives of the Makhnovists represent a radical departure from Bolshevik centralist and statist notions of socialism. Instead of a belief in hierarchical order and state-socialism, the Makhnovists held a commitment to the principles of anarchist communism. This is most evident in their construction of Free Territories wherever their oppressors were forcefully driven out. Such territories were managed according to a non-hierarchical, cooperative, free, egalitarian and participatory form of organization which represented true workers’ self-governance. Thus, in the Manifestos of the Makhnovist Movement, it is stated that " . . .only through the destruction of the state by means of social revolution can the genuine Worker-Peasant soviet system be realized and can we arrive at socialism."
In stark contrast to the vision of free and voluntary association put forth by the anarchists, Lenin’s form of communism sought to build a model of workers’ control on the old state framework which once upheld the control of the bourgeois. The ultimate goal was the creation of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as preached in the dialectical gospel of Marx. This was modified, of course, to place power in the hands of an elite Vanguard party of "professional revolutionaries" who supposedly knew what was best for the proletariat. From its origins then, Marxist-Leninism hinged on the notion that hierarchical authority, if properly utilized, can serve as a tool for emancipation. Thus, in Lenin’s 1902 work What Is To Be Done? , he asserts ". . . that no revolutionary movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders which preserves continuity . . . "
Alternatively, the anarchist program advocates an immediate and total revolution which is guided organically by the free desires of the workers themselves. For anarchists, a true revolution and the construction of an ideal mode of human organization includes the " . . . utilization of a direct and federative alliance and collaboration of the economic, social, technical, or other agencies (unions, cooperatives, etc.) locally, regionally, nationally, internationally, . . ." Thus, it is no surprise that Lenin viewed such true revolutionaries as a threat to his Bolshevik system of dominance and hierarchy. For this reason, Lenin initiated a violent campaign in 1919 against at all anarchists within Bolshevik territory which involved negative propaganda, arrests and executions. Moreover, the Red invasion of Ukraine was carried out with orders attached for soldiers to capture and imprison all Makhnovist revolutionaries. The Makhnovist anarchist revolutionary movement and the truly socialist communities which were established within Free Territories exemplify the real embodiment of a viable socialist order. However, this movement was violently suppressed by the very regime that is most commonly pointed toward as an example of a "socialist project." Nevertheless, a revolutionary anarchist communist position must ultimately face the somewhat compelling criticism of a realist perspective.
A typical realist criticism would attempt to dismantle the foundation of a revolutionary anarchist ideology on two main fronts: human nature and the nature of the international realm itself. The notion of a malleable human nature which is capable of supporting an egalitarian mode of organization is an implicit belief underlying socialist anarchist theory. By contrast, a realist analysis views human nature as inherently flawed and imperfect. The realist understands human nature to be plagued by what Reinhold Niebuhr calls a relativistic anxiety. Drawing from a biblical understanding of "the fall" of humankind from Devine standards, Niebuhr asserts that our imperfect nature results in the constant presence of inequality and a subsequent feeling of anxiety which pits us against each other. This notion of an inherently conflicting and unequal human condition is carried throughout all realist approaches and informs the unanimous belief that humans are doomed to an existence of shifting power relations and will forever be subject to the realities of injustice. Thus, although the anarchist ideal presents a desirable state of human affairs, a realist will claim that it is an unobtainable dream.
The second argument offered by a typical realist criticism is perhaps even more compelling than the general attack on human nature. According to a realist, the real world is characterized by constant international struggle between states pursuing their own self-interests through force. In turn, the constant pressure of a chaotic international realm works to dictate the boundaries of action within which any state must operate for its own well being. This reality of on going competition and the constant threat of force would be sure to crush any society or federated entity which possesses no military power and is committed to the unobtainable anarchist ideals of egalitarianism and cooperation. Thus, Zakaria highlights the point made by Waltz which suggests that although human nature can account for many instances of peace and is thus not all "bad," the international realm imposes upon the actions of any rational actor wishing to ensure the self-preservation of their country. According to a realist, it is this structural imposition which rules out the possibility of creating a "true socialist world order" regardless of whether the ideological slogan is of communism, Bolshevism, Menshevism, Leninism, Maknovism, anarchism, or any other host of "ism’s." In sum, a realist would claim that all idealist ideologies would eventually meet their failure in real practice due to the eternal reality of an imperfect world in regards to both the human condition and the character of the international realm. For the realist, the ideal world which ought to be will always stand in stark contrast to the world that is.
Fortunately, the grim perspective offered by realism, which works to defend a status quo of injustice and inequality, can still be challenged through the insights offered by anarchist political philosophers. Indeed, the Makhnovist revolutionaries held a belief in anarchist communism - a theory articulated by Peter Kropotkin. In his work Mutual Aid, Kropotkin lays out a scientific understanding of human nature which treats it as an evolutionary phenomenon propelled forward by the motor of mutual cooperation. In contrast to the prevailing evolutionary theories of social Darwinism, which functioned to justify capitalist relations of exploitation, Kropotkin asserts that our innate social instincts and the powerful force of human solidarity have contributed more toward ensuring our basic survival versus relations of competition and domination. Moreover, Kropotkin claims, the stable conditions created by mutual aid have functioned historically as the basis for our intellectual and creative development. Further, Kropotkin sees an integrative development taking place in terms of the inclusiveness of cooperative relations. Whereas cooperation begins with relations between isolated individuals, it spreads to clans, nations and, eventually, it will reach the international level. Thus, the full flowering of our humanity requires free and cooperative relations of equality worldwide. Perhaps, Niebuhr’s picture of a "fallen" humankind is inappropriate. Instead, a picture of humanity which is constantly evolving and striving toward ever greater degrees of cooperative morality is the most accurate. Of course, this process of growth will require an anarchist revolution for its full development.
The criticism offered by realism concerning the reality of a chaotic international realm seems to pose a significant barrier to the anarchist vision of an ideal world. However, this analysis, which pretends to be objective in its approach, actually reflects the embedded values and the specific version of reality constructed by the existence of states. It is easy to see that the current international realm is characterized by a constant struggle for power between states. What must be considered is that an anarchist ideology completely pulverizes the legitimacy of the state all together. Whereas statesmen may be structurally influenced in seeking to preserve the security of the state, an anarchist revolution would totally destroy such artificial divisions and would thus eliminate the necessity of war and constant struggle. In other words, the "real" world simply reflects the realities of a hierarchical order in which the full development of humanity remains stagnant. Anarchist revolution, as seen in the example of the Makhnovists, seeks to fundamentally alter this reality. Conflict between states presupposes the existence of states. Anarchy presupposes a form of organization which corresponds to a free humanity.
Anarchist feminist philosopher and Makhnovist sympathizer Emma Goldman once wrote, "[Revolution] is the transvaluator, the bearer of new values. It is the great teacher of the new ethics, inspiring man with a new concept of life and its manifestations in social relationships. It is the mental and spiritual regenerator." Indeed, the ideology which informs revolutionary action is of paramount significance. The anarchist platform advocates complete and total liberation in line with our greater potential as human beings. Thus, the example of the Makhnovists is important to consider for any individual inclined to view international relations in terms of the construction of an ideal world. Makhnovist ideology, commitment and practice present the only true and viable global socialist revolutionary project - anarchy.
"A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even looking at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias . . ."
- Oscar Wilde
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Marx & Keynes on Political Economy as a Moral Science
Introduction: The moral political economy of Marx and Keynes
Keynes and Marx can both be seen as proponents of political economy as a moral science in its ancient Greek meaning of ensuring the most amount of people with the means to live a good life. Aristotle describes the best way of life as a ". . . life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in activities of goodness." Both Keynes and Marx were educated in the classics and were influenced by this moral understanding of political and economic organization. Indeed, "moral" here implies certain shared ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions. They both write from a tradition which posits the existence of an objective and knowable good and which regards humans as potentially capable of knowing and actualizing the good in their activities. This fundamental framework of understanding will underpin both thinkers’ somewhat similar ideas of the ideal community through which the objectives of a moral political economy would be realized. For both, such a community would rightfully place economic activity as an instrumental means toward ensuring the good life filled with fully rational activities - activities which are an end in themself. These foundations are radically different from those dominant in a capitalist economy which, according to Keynes, rely on ". . . an intense appeal to the money-loving and money-making instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine." Thus, both Keynes and Marx will criticize the capitalist mode of production as fundamentally irrational and inconsistent with our higher potentials. However, the specific role which each thinker will assign to capitalist irrationality and irrational motives in general will result in different conceptions of the possibilities and the actual shape of an ideal community. This paper will explore the degree to which each thinker can be said to support the notion of political economy as a moral science in relation to their conceptions of the ideal and their different treatments of irrationality.
The objective good and the ideal community: Marx
Keynes and Marx attribute the existence of an objective and knowable good to reality as a whole. This ontological assumption is rooted in ancient Greek thought and will later resurface in the strain of thought known as German idealism. Thus, Hegel will express the sentiment that "Reason governs the world." This means that there are objective and knowable values contained in the universe. Further, human beings are understood as having the unique potential to develop the capabilities necessary for experiencing the good in our activities through the exercise of our faculty of reason.
According to Marx, objective truth can be grounded in our rational experience through rational activity. Wholly rational activities are truly universal in the sense that they are ends in themself activities - they are productive of a moment to which an individual would say "stay." Our essence as a species-being is such that we consciously notice our own universality and accordingly regard ourselves as free. In other words, our essence is defined by our potential for rationality. Marx will elaborate the content of objective and knowable good activities as consisting of the creation and appropriation of beauty and truth within relations of mutual recognition. This constitutes Marx’s idea of the true realm of freedom. It is a realm defined by "the development of human powers as an end in itself." Our universal development implies reciprocal relations of mutual recognition based on the social nature of the developed capabilities to create and appropriate the intellectual and aesthetic "goods of the soul." Marx points to the social nature of the creation and appropriation of truth in his discussion of rational scientific activity. He says, "Not only is the material of my activity. . . given to me as a social product, but my own existence is social activity; what I make of myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social." This is further elaborated in Marx’s notion of the developed senses of the universal individual. For instance, it becomes clear that a full capacity to appropriate a beautiful work of music requires the developed human senses to hear what is objectively good. These subjective senses are developed themselves only through another individual’s creation of beautiful music as an object of appropriation. For Marx, this means that rational individuals who are capable of acting in line with a universal good would naturally adopt ethical relations of mutual respect and love. Indeed, such a rational community would collectively recognize that "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Naturally, economic activities in the realm of necessity would be brought under the collective control of rational individuals so as to maximize the time spent for all in the realm of free activities. Thus, instrumental activities are treated as a means to the good life.
Keynes’ notion of the good and the ideal community
Keynes posits the existence of an objective and knowable good which is accessible to human beings through our developed rationality. In his work My Early Beliefs, Keynes outlines his main ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions through an account of the "religion" accepted by himself and his peers in the Bloomsbury group. By religion, Keynes is referring to an accepted set of conceptions underlying one’s notion of the self and the ultimate. Keynes and the Bloomsbury group were largely influenced by the set of ideas expressed in Moore’s Principia Ethica. The essential notion put forward here was that the good is an objective and knowable quality which we can ground in our rational experience. More specifically, the good consists of a fulfilled state of mind brought about through the rational contemplation of truth, love and beauty. In Aristotelean terms, the objective good is a feeling of eudaemonia, which is the highest end of all activity - it is an end in itself. Moreover, according to Moore, there is a reciprocal relationship between this chief state of mind and the object which is deserving of this feeling. The feeling of love requires an object which possesses lovable qualities. Keynes will add that this type of organic interdependence will stretch throughout time in relation to the best sate of mind as opposed to remaining relevant only in the strictly narrow sense put forth by Moore. Therefore, our rational experience is connected to moments of past and present throughout time in a social whole. Indeed, Keynes claims that this fundamental set of assumptions most closely approximates the truth.
The foundational assumptions accepted by Keynes closely resemble Marx’s ideas concerning the nature of the good. However, Keynes does not explicitly make the same definite connection between the rationality required for activities filled with beauty and truth and the creation of relations of love. Nevertheless, he paints a picture of an ideal community which shares an emphasis on the developed capabilities required to live a good life. Keynes claims that in a society which has outgrown the immediate pressures of the economic problem, those who will benefit will be the fully rational individuals who are capable mastering "the art of life itself" as opposed to investing all of their time in the mere means of life. This asserts the ancient wisdom of Aristotle who declared to his audience: "You can see for yourselves that the happy life . . . belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can use, and are lacking in goods of the soul." Indeed, Keynes says that the ideal community would prize and conduce activities which are an end in themself above those economic activities of necessity. He recognizes the need to make such instrumental work ". . . as widely shared as possible" in order to maximize time spent partaking in rational activities. For Keynes, the activities of the business man are regarded as useful only as a means to the material requirements of truly good activities. Activities which find their sole interest and ends in economic benefits are thoroughly rejected by Keynes on a moral basis.
The irrationality of capitalism for Marx and Keynes
Marx and Keynes both criticize the set of relations characteristic of a capitalist system of production as inconsistent with the ideal relations and developed rationality which provide the basis of the good life. Indeed, both thinkers will deem capitalism as inherently irrational. Contrary to the set of assumptions adopted by Keynes and Marx which regard humans as potentially capable of actualizing the good, dominant economic thought presupposes relations of utility and takes ". . . an alienated form of social intercourse as the essential, original, and definitive human form." Instrumental means are wrongfully championed above our higher ends. Indeed, Keynes will focus on the love of money as the central moral problem of our day. Keynes explicitly rejects the Benthamite tradition which regards human beings as rational calculators of self-interest and utility. He describes this tradition of thought as ". . . the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of western civilization and is responsible for its present moral decay." Thus, the pursuit of personal profits as an end, which capitalism takes as natural, is viewed by Keynes as a "disgusting morbidity." It is fundamentally inconsistent with the developed rationality required to actualize the good life.
Marx asserts that the relations created by the institution of private property are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Instead of our activity being fully free and rational, private property creates relations of production defined by large masses of propertyless people forced to engage in wage-labour. This means that our activities, products and relations all exist in the form of alienation. Our essence as potentially universally developed individuals capable of actualizing the good life through our rational activities, products and relations, is estranged from us due to relations of utility and exploitation. Marx asserts, "Under the presupposition of private property it [labour] is an externalization of life because I work in order to live and provide for myself the means of living." Moreover, relations between property owners are not defined by free human activities. All human relations are conceived by classical economics as utilitarian relations resembling the interactions of merchants. Marx explains that such relations would produce individuals incapable of understanding "a human language."They are alienated from our essence as potentially rational beings capable of producing a human world in which "Our products would be so many mirrors reflecting our nature." Keynes and Marx are both critical of the irrational inclination within capitalism to treat instrumental goods as an ends in themself. They will both reject the dominant doctrine that ". . . the (business man) could attain the philosopher’s summum bonum by just pursuing his own private profit." Although Keynes and Marx produce similar criticisms of capitalism, they will diverge in their specific treatments of the irrationality contained within it. This will have important implications on their respective notions of the ideal community and the degree to which each can be seen as a representative of political economy as a moral science.
Marx: Irrationality as a motor of development - The genesis of communism
Marx’s treatment of capitalist irrationality sublates Hegel’s idea of the passions. Hegel uses the term passions to designate irrational, selfish and un-fulfilling motives which are the basis of activities that are inconsistent with the ideal. For Marx, the capitalist passions consist of an irrational pursuit of the instrumental good of money as if it were an ends. This is conducive to relations of utility and exploitation which impede the immediate full development of the social being. However, Marx also inherits Hegel’s teleological view of human history which makes forces of irrationality positively developmental in a dialectical growth of human reason. Thus, Marx will regard capitalist irrationality as an educational stage in the genesis of the true realm of freedom. Marx asserts, "The overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation." Private property and alienation play a positive role by unknowingly generating the necessary subjective and objective preconditions for a community of freedom. The creation of objective requirements refers to the mass amount of material abundance created through capitalist production. Marx lends praise to the expansive nature of capitalism and its constant revolutionizing of the tools used to produce our material world. The subjective preconditions unintentionally created by capitalism refers to the paradoxical development of human rationality. In other words, those capitalist relations which are inconsistent with ideal relations of freedom will give birth to individuals with the developed capacities necessary for negating those same irrational relations. This notion of a dialectical growth of reason appropriates Hegel’s idea of the master-slave relation. Hegel regards the undesirable relations of slavery as positively developmental for the slave. The slave forms a higher state of consciousness involving a view to the future through the use of tools. Whereas the master is only in a position to enjoy the slave’s products subjectively, the slave undergoes a process of development which enables them to understand an objective good of which they are a real agent.
For Marx, exploited workers are paradoxically developing the consciousness and virtues which will enable them to be active agents in the creation of true freedom. For instance, since private property creates a class of workers who share in their common subjection, there is a natural evolution of workers’ organizations. Marx sees this type of organic union as providing the conditions for people to recognize the superior form of wealth which exists in other human beings. Marx describes, "association, society and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them [socialist workers]; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them . . ." Further, Marx makes revolutionary activity itself an educational process in the development of mind. The appropriation of the totality of the forces of production implies the universal development of the individual which is propelled forward in the very act of appropriating.
Marshall Berman captures the dialectical role of capitalist irrationality quite beautifully in his phrase, "Capitalism will be melted by the heat of its own incandescent energies." This image of a brilliantly melting capitalist mode of production is accompanied for Marx by the wonderful construction of an ideal community. Presupposing capitalism, the objective and subjective preconditions have been generated for a fully free society capable of reflecting the ethos of a moral political economy in its principle of distribution, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" Marx’s vision of political economy is absolutely moral owing to his teleological vision of human history which makes capitalist irrationality the oblivious forceful fingertips that pull along the thread of human development toward our ends of freedom.
Keynes, Irrationality and Psycho Analysis - A theory of reform
Like Marx, Keynes views capitalist irrationality as occupying a paradoxically positive role in the shaping of a society which rightfully prizes the ends above the means. However, this irrationality will not be treated by Keynes in a manner which allows for its eventual dissolving under the rule of reason. Instead, capitalist irrationality will be explained by Keynes in psycho analytic terms. There is sufficient textual and background evidence to suggest that Keynes directly applies Freudian psycho analysis to his understanding of economics. He explicitly expresses an admiration for the insights contained in Freud’s method in a letter to the editor in which he says, "Professor Freud seems to me to be endowed, to the degree of genius, with the scientific imagination which can body forth an abundance of innovating ideas . . . " The important insights which Keynes draws from Freud deal with the deeper instinctual motives which lay inside of all humans. Thus, in his essay titled My Early Beliefs, Keynes rejects the idea that all humans are innately rational on the basis that there are ". . . insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men."
The irrational motives of capitalism which Keynes outlines as ". . . an intense appeal to the money-loving and money-making instincts . . . " and the additional "sadistic love of power" are understood to be sublimations of our deeper more destructive instincts. More specifically, the money motives reflect an anal-sadistic character rooted in the sublimation of anal-erotism and the death instinct. Keynes does not discuss the implications of psycho analysis on his economics explicitly due to the complexities involved in human defense mechanisms and the perceived material efficiency of capitalism during the historical epoch in which he was writing. According to Keynes, humankind could not yet "afford" to assess the irrationality of the money motives. However, many references throughout his works suggest that he is consciously adopting Freudian analysis. For instance, in a discussion regarding the moral emptiness of those individuals who are interested in pursuing economic benefits, Keynes links the love of money with a deeper instinctual motive which people "fall back on" that is directly linked to our libidinal drives - our sexual erotic tendencies. Keynes also links capitalist "purposiveness" (the irrational pursuit of instrumental gain) to the death instinct and a will to be immortal. For this reason ". . . jam is not jam unless it is a case of jam tomorrow and never jam today." Essentially, money and the pursuit of monetary gain act as a dartboard to catch the deadly arrows of human irrational wickedness which now have a target of aim.
To be sure, capitalist irrationality and the money-motives are regarded by Keynes to be antithetical to our full moral growth and the objective good. Keynes refers to capitalist motives as being opposite from the true human virtues. However, they are seen as paradoxically positive to certain extent in reaching our closest approximation to the ideal community. Keynes views money as a positive sublimation of our deeper dangerous instincts. The pursuit of private wealth will construct a large portion of the "thin and precarious crust" that is civilization. Keynes is also hopeful that the superior material efficiency of capitalism will eliminate the economic struggle of existence within the next one hundred years from the time he was writing. It becomes clear that the type of fully free ideal community envisioned by Marx is impractical for Keynes due to his psycho analytic understanding of irrationality. Instead, Keynes will be an advocate of reform through which we will be "slowly reconstructing our social system." Keynes proposes a regulated market with a rich investment in the arts. Further, due to our constitutional irrationality, we must allow for the economic game to be played within reasonable limits. However, economic activities will be regarded only as a means to ends in themself activities. Political economy can be viewed as a moral science here in the strictest sense for being primarily concerned with the provision of the requirements to live a life which most closely approximates the good. The melting away of our innate irrationality is simply not possible for Keynes. Thus, the role of economic activity is purely instrumental toward fully free human activities, and yet sadly "how few of us can sing!"
Concluding thoughts
Keynes and Marx both express valuable insights which are worthy of contemplation. Surely though, it is also useful to consider the apparent inconsistencies or contradictions with each thinker. For instance, Keynes champions the superior efficiency of an irrational capitalist mode of production. However, this misses the fact that a mode of production which is defined by highly developed rationality would necessarily be more efficient than one dominated by irrational motives. For Marx, capitalism creates an abundance of material wealth as a precondition for freedom. Ultimately though, a wholly rational community of universally developed individuals would be able to ". . . govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it . . . accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy. . ."This would undoubtably be the most efficient form of production. At the same time, this idea points to a major defect in Marx’s philosophy which Keynes will being to light. Marx does not possess the same insight into irrational human motives that Keynes will develop with the use of psycho analysis. The evidence regarding human irrationality suggested by psycho analysis points to real barriers for an emergence of Marx’s totally rational society. We have seen how this view of irrationality leads to Keynes adopting a reformist position. However, Keynes also supports coercive and dangerous policies such as eugenics as a solution to this problem. It seems as though this type of oppressive control would work to preserve relations which are antithetical to an ideal commonwealth. It is clear that neither Marx nor Keynes is able to present us with a perfect answer regarding the creation of a truly moral political economy. However, it remains of invaluable importance that we preserve the fundamental ancient wisdom which expresses a true concern for a moral objective within our political and economic modes of organization - to ensure the means for a good life.
Keynes and Marx can both be seen as proponents of political economy as a moral science in its ancient Greek meaning of ensuring the most amount of people with the means to live a good life. Aristotle describes the best way of life as a ". . . life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in activities of goodness." Both Keynes and Marx were educated in the classics and were influenced by this moral understanding of political and economic organization. Indeed, "moral" here implies certain shared ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions. They both write from a tradition which posits the existence of an objective and knowable good and which regards humans as potentially capable of knowing and actualizing the good in their activities. This fundamental framework of understanding will underpin both thinkers’ somewhat similar ideas of the ideal community through which the objectives of a moral political economy would be realized. For both, such a community would rightfully place economic activity as an instrumental means toward ensuring the good life filled with fully rational activities - activities which are an end in themself. These foundations are radically different from those dominant in a capitalist economy which, according to Keynes, rely on ". . . an intense appeal to the money-loving and money-making instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine." Thus, both Keynes and Marx will criticize the capitalist mode of production as fundamentally irrational and inconsistent with our higher potentials. However, the specific role which each thinker will assign to capitalist irrationality and irrational motives in general will result in different conceptions of the possibilities and the actual shape of an ideal community. This paper will explore the degree to which each thinker can be said to support the notion of political economy as a moral science in relation to their conceptions of the ideal and their different treatments of irrationality.
The objective good and the ideal community: Marx
Keynes and Marx attribute the existence of an objective and knowable good to reality as a whole. This ontological assumption is rooted in ancient Greek thought and will later resurface in the strain of thought known as German idealism. Thus, Hegel will express the sentiment that "Reason governs the world." This means that there are objective and knowable values contained in the universe. Further, human beings are understood as having the unique potential to develop the capabilities necessary for experiencing the good in our activities through the exercise of our faculty of reason.
According to Marx, objective truth can be grounded in our rational experience through rational activity. Wholly rational activities are truly universal in the sense that they are ends in themself activities - they are productive of a moment to which an individual would say "stay." Our essence as a species-being is such that we consciously notice our own universality and accordingly regard ourselves as free. In other words, our essence is defined by our potential for rationality. Marx will elaborate the content of objective and knowable good activities as consisting of the creation and appropriation of beauty and truth within relations of mutual recognition. This constitutes Marx’s idea of the true realm of freedom. It is a realm defined by "the development of human powers as an end in itself." Our universal development implies reciprocal relations of mutual recognition based on the social nature of the developed capabilities to create and appropriate the intellectual and aesthetic "goods of the soul." Marx points to the social nature of the creation and appropriation of truth in his discussion of rational scientific activity. He says, "Not only is the material of my activity. . . given to me as a social product, but my own existence is social activity; what I make of myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social." This is further elaborated in Marx’s notion of the developed senses of the universal individual. For instance, it becomes clear that a full capacity to appropriate a beautiful work of music requires the developed human senses to hear what is objectively good. These subjective senses are developed themselves only through another individual’s creation of beautiful music as an object of appropriation. For Marx, this means that rational individuals who are capable of acting in line with a universal good would naturally adopt ethical relations of mutual respect and love. Indeed, such a rational community would collectively recognize that "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Naturally, economic activities in the realm of necessity would be brought under the collective control of rational individuals so as to maximize the time spent for all in the realm of free activities. Thus, instrumental activities are treated as a means to the good life.
Keynes’ notion of the good and the ideal community
Keynes posits the existence of an objective and knowable good which is accessible to human beings through our developed rationality. In his work My Early Beliefs, Keynes outlines his main ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions through an account of the "religion" accepted by himself and his peers in the Bloomsbury group. By religion, Keynes is referring to an accepted set of conceptions underlying one’s notion of the self and the ultimate. Keynes and the Bloomsbury group were largely influenced by the set of ideas expressed in Moore’s Principia Ethica. The essential notion put forward here was that the good is an objective and knowable quality which we can ground in our rational experience. More specifically, the good consists of a fulfilled state of mind brought about through the rational contemplation of truth, love and beauty. In Aristotelean terms, the objective good is a feeling of eudaemonia, which is the highest end of all activity - it is an end in itself. Moreover, according to Moore, there is a reciprocal relationship between this chief state of mind and the object which is deserving of this feeling. The feeling of love requires an object which possesses lovable qualities. Keynes will add that this type of organic interdependence will stretch throughout time in relation to the best sate of mind as opposed to remaining relevant only in the strictly narrow sense put forth by Moore. Therefore, our rational experience is connected to moments of past and present throughout time in a social whole. Indeed, Keynes claims that this fundamental set of assumptions most closely approximates the truth.
The foundational assumptions accepted by Keynes closely resemble Marx’s ideas concerning the nature of the good. However, Keynes does not explicitly make the same definite connection between the rationality required for activities filled with beauty and truth and the creation of relations of love. Nevertheless, he paints a picture of an ideal community which shares an emphasis on the developed capabilities required to live a good life. Keynes claims that in a society which has outgrown the immediate pressures of the economic problem, those who will benefit will be the fully rational individuals who are capable mastering "the art of life itself" as opposed to investing all of their time in the mere means of life. This asserts the ancient wisdom of Aristotle who declared to his audience: "You can see for yourselves that the happy life . . . belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can use, and are lacking in goods of the soul." Indeed, Keynes says that the ideal community would prize and conduce activities which are an end in themself above those economic activities of necessity. He recognizes the need to make such instrumental work ". . . as widely shared as possible" in order to maximize time spent partaking in rational activities. For Keynes, the activities of the business man are regarded as useful only as a means to the material requirements of truly good activities. Activities which find their sole interest and ends in economic benefits are thoroughly rejected by Keynes on a moral basis.
The irrationality of capitalism for Marx and Keynes
Marx and Keynes both criticize the set of relations characteristic of a capitalist system of production as inconsistent with the ideal relations and developed rationality which provide the basis of the good life. Indeed, both thinkers will deem capitalism as inherently irrational. Contrary to the set of assumptions adopted by Keynes and Marx which regard humans as potentially capable of actualizing the good, dominant economic thought presupposes relations of utility and takes ". . . an alienated form of social intercourse as the essential, original, and definitive human form." Instrumental means are wrongfully championed above our higher ends. Indeed, Keynes will focus on the love of money as the central moral problem of our day. Keynes explicitly rejects the Benthamite tradition which regards human beings as rational calculators of self-interest and utility. He describes this tradition of thought as ". . . the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of western civilization and is responsible for its present moral decay." Thus, the pursuit of personal profits as an end, which capitalism takes as natural, is viewed by Keynes as a "disgusting morbidity." It is fundamentally inconsistent with the developed rationality required to actualize the good life.
Marx asserts that the relations created by the institution of private property are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Instead of our activity being fully free and rational, private property creates relations of production defined by large masses of propertyless people forced to engage in wage-labour. This means that our activities, products and relations all exist in the form of alienation. Our essence as potentially universally developed individuals capable of actualizing the good life through our rational activities, products and relations, is estranged from us due to relations of utility and exploitation. Marx asserts, "Under the presupposition of private property it [labour] is an externalization of life because I work in order to live and provide for myself the means of living." Moreover, relations between property owners are not defined by free human activities. All human relations are conceived by classical economics as utilitarian relations resembling the interactions of merchants. Marx explains that such relations would produce individuals incapable of understanding "a human language."They are alienated from our essence as potentially rational beings capable of producing a human world in which "Our products would be so many mirrors reflecting our nature." Keynes and Marx are both critical of the irrational inclination within capitalism to treat instrumental goods as an ends in themself. They will both reject the dominant doctrine that ". . . the (business man) could attain the philosopher’s summum bonum by just pursuing his own private profit." Although Keynes and Marx produce similar criticisms of capitalism, they will diverge in their specific treatments of the irrationality contained within it. This will have important implications on their respective notions of the ideal community and the degree to which each can be seen as a representative of political economy as a moral science.
Marx: Irrationality as a motor of development - The genesis of communism
Marx’s treatment of capitalist irrationality sublates Hegel’s idea of the passions. Hegel uses the term passions to designate irrational, selfish and un-fulfilling motives which are the basis of activities that are inconsistent with the ideal. For Marx, the capitalist passions consist of an irrational pursuit of the instrumental good of money as if it were an ends. This is conducive to relations of utility and exploitation which impede the immediate full development of the social being. However, Marx also inherits Hegel’s teleological view of human history which makes forces of irrationality positively developmental in a dialectical growth of human reason. Thus, Marx will regard capitalist irrationality as an educational stage in the genesis of the true realm of freedom. Marx asserts, "The overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation." Private property and alienation play a positive role by unknowingly generating the necessary subjective and objective preconditions for a community of freedom. The creation of objective requirements refers to the mass amount of material abundance created through capitalist production. Marx lends praise to the expansive nature of capitalism and its constant revolutionizing of the tools used to produce our material world. The subjective preconditions unintentionally created by capitalism refers to the paradoxical development of human rationality. In other words, those capitalist relations which are inconsistent with ideal relations of freedom will give birth to individuals with the developed capacities necessary for negating those same irrational relations. This notion of a dialectical growth of reason appropriates Hegel’s idea of the master-slave relation. Hegel regards the undesirable relations of slavery as positively developmental for the slave. The slave forms a higher state of consciousness involving a view to the future through the use of tools. Whereas the master is only in a position to enjoy the slave’s products subjectively, the slave undergoes a process of development which enables them to understand an objective good of which they are a real agent.
For Marx, exploited workers are paradoxically developing the consciousness and virtues which will enable them to be active agents in the creation of true freedom. For instance, since private property creates a class of workers who share in their common subjection, there is a natural evolution of workers’ organizations. Marx sees this type of organic union as providing the conditions for people to recognize the superior form of wealth which exists in other human beings. Marx describes, "association, society and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them [socialist workers]; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them . . ." Further, Marx makes revolutionary activity itself an educational process in the development of mind. The appropriation of the totality of the forces of production implies the universal development of the individual which is propelled forward in the very act of appropriating.
Marshall Berman captures the dialectical role of capitalist irrationality quite beautifully in his phrase, "Capitalism will be melted by the heat of its own incandescent energies." This image of a brilliantly melting capitalist mode of production is accompanied for Marx by the wonderful construction of an ideal community. Presupposing capitalism, the objective and subjective preconditions have been generated for a fully free society capable of reflecting the ethos of a moral political economy in its principle of distribution, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" Marx’s vision of political economy is absolutely moral owing to his teleological vision of human history which makes capitalist irrationality the oblivious forceful fingertips that pull along the thread of human development toward our ends of freedom.
Keynes, Irrationality and Psycho Analysis - A theory of reform
Like Marx, Keynes views capitalist irrationality as occupying a paradoxically positive role in the shaping of a society which rightfully prizes the ends above the means. However, this irrationality will not be treated by Keynes in a manner which allows for its eventual dissolving under the rule of reason. Instead, capitalist irrationality will be explained by Keynes in psycho analytic terms. There is sufficient textual and background evidence to suggest that Keynes directly applies Freudian psycho analysis to his understanding of economics. He explicitly expresses an admiration for the insights contained in Freud’s method in a letter to the editor in which he says, "Professor Freud seems to me to be endowed, to the degree of genius, with the scientific imagination which can body forth an abundance of innovating ideas . . . " The important insights which Keynes draws from Freud deal with the deeper instinctual motives which lay inside of all humans. Thus, in his essay titled My Early Beliefs, Keynes rejects the idea that all humans are innately rational on the basis that there are ". . . insane and irrational springs of wickedness in most men."
The irrational motives of capitalism which Keynes outlines as ". . . an intense appeal to the money-loving and money-making instincts . . . " and the additional "sadistic love of power" are understood to be sublimations of our deeper more destructive instincts. More specifically, the money motives reflect an anal-sadistic character rooted in the sublimation of anal-erotism and the death instinct. Keynes does not discuss the implications of psycho analysis on his economics explicitly due to the complexities involved in human defense mechanisms and the perceived material efficiency of capitalism during the historical epoch in which he was writing. According to Keynes, humankind could not yet "afford" to assess the irrationality of the money motives. However, many references throughout his works suggest that he is consciously adopting Freudian analysis. For instance, in a discussion regarding the moral emptiness of those individuals who are interested in pursuing economic benefits, Keynes links the love of money with a deeper instinctual motive which people "fall back on" that is directly linked to our libidinal drives - our sexual erotic tendencies. Keynes also links capitalist "purposiveness" (the irrational pursuit of instrumental gain) to the death instinct and a will to be immortal. For this reason ". . . jam is not jam unless it is a case of jam tomorrow and never jam today." Essentially, money and the pursuit of monetary gain act as a dartboard to catch the deadly arrows of human irrational wickedness which now have a target of aim.
To be sure, capitalist irrationality and the money-motives are regarded by Keynes to be antithetical to our full moral growth and the objective good. Keynes refers to capitalist motives as being opposite from the true human virtues. However, they are seen as paradoxically positive to certain extent in reaching our closest approximation to the ideal community. Keynes views money as a positive sublimation of our deeper dangerous instincts. The pursuit of private wealth will construct a large portion of the "thin and precarious crust" that is civilization. Keynes is also hopeful that the superior material efficiency of capitalism will eliminate the economic struggle of existence within the next one hundred years from the time he was writing. It becomes clear that the type of fully free ideal community envisioned by Marx is impractical for Keynes due to his psycho analytic understanding of irrationality. Instead, Keynes will be an advocate of reform through which we will be "slowly reconstructing our social system." Keynes proposes a regulated market with a rich investment in the arts. Further, due to our constitutional irrationality, we must allow for the economic game to be played within reasonable limits. However, economic activities will be regarded only as a means to ends in themself activities. Political economy can be viewed as a moral science here in the strictest sense for being primarily concerned with the provision of the requirements to live a life which most closely approximates the good. The melting away of our innate irrationality is simply not possible for Keynes. Thus, the role of economic activity is purely instrumental toward fully free human activities, and yet sadly "how few of us can sing!"
Concluding thoughts
Keynes and Marx both express valuable insights which are worthy of contemplation. Surely though, it is also useful to consider the apparent inconsistencies or contradictions with each thinker. For instance, Keynes champions the superior efficiency of an irrational capitalist mode of production. However, this misses the fact that a mode of production which is defined by highly developed rationality would necessarily be more efficient than one dominated by irrational motives. For Marx, capitalism creates an abundance of material wealth as a precondition for freedom. Ultimately though, a wholly rational community of universally developed individuals would be able to ". . . govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it . . . accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy. . ."This would undoubtably be the most efficient form of production. At the same time, this idea points to a major defect in Marx’s philosophy which Keynes will being to light. Marx does not possess the same insight into irrational human motives that Keynes will develop with the use of psycho analysis. The evidence regarding human irrationality suggested by psycho analysis points to real barriers for an emergence of Marx’s totally rational society. We have seen how this view of irrationality leads to Keynes adopting a reformist position. However, Keynes also supports coercive and dangerous policies such as eugenics as a solution to this problem. It seems as though this type of oppressive control would work to preserve relations which are antithetical to an ideal commonwealth. It is clear that neither Marx nor Keynes is able to present us with a perfect answer regarding the creation of a truly moral political economy. However, it remains of invaluable importance that we preserve the fundamental ancient wisdom which expresses a true concern for a moral objective within our political and economic modes of organization - to ensure the means for a good life.
Saturday, March 22, 2008
A-Moral 'Matter'
This is a paper I wrote for a political theory course. It is essentially a criticism of the amoral political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, paying particular attention to his scientific materialist/atomist ontology. In a way, it can be viewed as a continuation of the last paper I posted on Marxism and organicism. It is an elaboration of the defining features of an atomist ontology which has largely dominated political economics (as well as philosophy, the sciences, etc) since the 17thC. Indeed, Hobbes is a prominent thinker within the early tradition of liberalism. The prevailing political/economic theories accepted today stem from these roots of thought. Thus, we are acquainted with the term neo-liberalism. Without doubt, the fundamental assumptions put forth by Hobbes regarding the nature of being and human being in particular are fairly important for anyone considering modern capitalist ideology. This remains to be the case even though Hobbes' conclusion of the absolute sovereign will be rejected by the following tradition of liberalism. The underlying view of human beings as self-seeking utility-maximizing machines will remain a central theme of modern economics - a view which is antithetical to a moralistic approach.
Hobbes’ Leviathan contains a highly systematic and scientific treatment of human nature and human relations which serves to legitimize an amoral mode of political organization characterized by the rule of an absolute sovereign. Hobbes begins the Leviathan by setting forth an ontology of scientific materialism which will guide him in his method of investigation and, consequentially, in his assumptions concerning the nature of human beings. A scientific materialist ontological framework presupposes that all being consists of bits of atomic matter in constant motion. Therefore, human beings are understood by Hobbes to be complex, yet atomic, systems of matter in motion propelled by our appetites and aversions. This provides no room to conceive of interdependence, purposiveness or the existence of an objective good. Hobbes deduces a hypothetical picture of our state of nature from these assumed fundamental axioms of human character. He asserts that humans would be prone to pulverize each other, paradoxically stemming from our desire for self-preservation and continued motion.
Political organization, according to Hobbes, must be primarily concerned with the preservation of our species by way of protecting all self-seeking individuals from their self-seeking neighbours. This requires an absolute sovereign who represents force and violence in order to direct the continued motion of the masses for their own protection. Notions of higher human potential and essence which may provide a basis for a moral conception of political organizagtion are not only excluded from this particular ontological framework, Hobbes addresses them as being absurd and even dangerous to our continued existence. In this paper, the influence of Hobbes’ ontology on his ideas of human being and political power will be critically explored in light of the view that our political organization ought to have a moral basis. Hobbes’ underlying assumptions will be contrasted with a radically different set of assumptions derivable from an alternative ontology of organicism - the notion of organic interdependence. An organicist ontology will be represented through some key ideas in the ancient political philosophy of Aristotle which treat human beings as potentially capable of living a eudaemonic life through the developed capabilities and virtues made possible by our faculty of reason. Political organization can be regarded here as having the moral objective of allowing humans to actualize the good life. Important problems with Aristotle’s method will also be brought to light and considered. However, the main ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions put forth by Aristotle will be presented as a positive alternative to the authoritarian and amoral conclusions of Hobbes.
It makes most sense to begin by elucidating the central tenants and implications of a scientific materialist ontology through an examination of Hobbes’ methodology and other early evidence of his ontological assumptions. Hobbes relies on the investigative model of geometry in his exploration into human relations. This style of mathematical investigation favours axiomatic deductive reasoning. Thus, when applied to human phenomena, this method implicitly suggests that all living reality contains a static character which is deducible and calculable as such. Indeed, for Hobbes, the only thing that exists to be taken into scientific account is a relative and subjective concrete material reality. Notions of 'good' and 'bad' or 'true' and 'false' are only the result of names which we ascribe to our outside reality. There is no inherent and objective truth or goodness contained in the universe. Thus, the truth which we are given through geometry rests upon the proper use and calculation of names which adequately represent material reality. Universality is only a characteristic of agreed definitions which register similarity between things in our material world. Artificially constructed language is a tool capable of removing ourselves from immediacy in order to gain recognition of universals. Beyond this, there is no truth and, consequently, there is no purposiveness in the movement of life. So far, this ontological scheme has been shown to view all reality as being made up of bits of matter with no room for ideas concerning 'essence' or 'purpose.' Indeed, Hobbes explicitly addressees such notions as being grounded in absurdity. Such absurdity is said to stem from the use of what he calls 'senseless speech.' That is, words that do not represent concrete material phenomena, such as the idea of a 'free will' which implies a freedom outside of its negative sense as unhindered motion. Hobbes attacks Aristotelean philosophy for the use of absurd speech which wrongfully signifies entities or forces which exist outside of our material reality.
For Hobbes, reality consists of nothing other than matter in motion. He describes a very mechanical conception of the human being in which '. . .life is but a motion of limbs.' Here we arrive at another key tenant of a scientific materialist ontology - external relations. External relations implies that the character of a given entity remains separate and non-dependent from its relations with other isolated bodies. Hobbes goes on in the same passage to describe the human heart as a spring, our nerves as strings and so on. There is no conception of interdependence through which we can picture the heart as being a heart in virtue of its relation to the nerves and vice versa. Thus, Hobbes describes political systems as being artificially created as opposed to attributing their existence to an organic growth resulting from an interdependence of factors in a living universe. Thus, the ontological framework of scientific materialism accepted by Hobbes conceives reality as constituted by isolated bits of moving matter in external relations with no higher good or interdependence. This has an important influence on his conception of the nature of human beings.Following the conception of reality set forth by a scientific materialist ontology, human beings are conceived by Hobbes to be nothing more than intricate and mechanical systems of matter in motion. Human beings are supposedly governed by a law of eternal motion which applies to all physical reality. Hobbes raises a picture in our minds of those familiar rolling waves which move across a body of water long after their principal source of motion (the wind) has died out. He then goes on to compare this evidence of continued motion with the internal motions which take place inside humans. Hobbes describes these internal motions as beginning with the operation of the senses in relation to the external world of objects and culminating in our voluntary motion. The process begins when our immediate senses become manifest as imagination or memory - sense which has 'decayed.' Such imagination will form our general desires and endeavours, expressed in the form of appetites and aversions. For Hobbes, this marks the origin of human emotions. Those things we are said to 'love' or 'hate' are simply expressions of our relative appetites or aversions which stem from our sensory experiences and the motions of imagination. Hobbes’ scheme of thought leaves no room to conceive of emotions as feelings which are consistent with our proximity to an objective good in our activities.
For Hobbes, our faculty of reason is regarded as a calculative device which is governed by the demands of our passions and desires. Hobbes speaks of reason as an acquired wit which is developed by our passions, namely the desire for power. Power, Hobbes says, is the '. . . present means to obtain some future apparent good. . .' Essentially, humans are liable to exercise their calculative faculty of reason when motivated by subjective desires created by their random mechanical interactions with other bits of matter in motion. Hobbes explains: '. . . thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and find the way to things desired . . .' The final stage of internal motion before the emergence of voluntary action is the culmination of a will. The human will is produced after one takes part in a process of deliberation which narrows down and restricts all of the different options produced by our desires. Hobbes concludes from this mechanical view of humankind that the happiness and well being of any given human depends on their relative capability to satisfy all of their different desires through rational deliberation. He continues to explicitly denounce the notion of a mind completely contented. This type of satisfaction of our desires would bring an end to our continued motion which, for Hobbes, would imply an absence of life all together. Therefore, there is no room for the idea of objectively good activities which are an end in themselves. Our voluntary motions are such that they seek an endless movement from one instrumental good to the next. Further, we seek not only immediate pleasure but are largely driven by a view to the future which urges us to ensure our continual pleasure through the fulfillment of our appetites. From these premises Hobbes will claim that the human character is marked by '. . . a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.' This picture of the nature of human individuals has enormous implications for Hobbes’ conception of the types of relations which are 'natural' among human beings. This will be expressed in his idea of a hypothetical state of nature.
Following his scientific method of investigation, Hobbes has broken down the various elements of human life into fixed and calculable axioms. A notion of our state of nature is deduced from these assumed axioms pertaining to our innate character. How would these complex human 'atoms' interact without what Hobbes views as the artificial construct of political power and civil society? According to Hobbes, if all self-seeking individuals are continually moved by a desire for 'power after power' with no complete satisfaction available, we would eventually be prone to engage in competitive relations in order to ensure our own future pleasures. Therefore, individuals will become inclined to wish dominance over other human beings and this will find its ultimate expression in the act of murder. An individual’s power is seen by Hobbes to be entirely relative to the power of others. There is no room to conceive of an interdependence of power where my abilities are the precondition for your abilities. Instead, Hobbes paints a picture of violent atomic clashes taking place between human beings. Further, since we are all equally endowed with the means to take another persons life, we all necessarily become equally inclined to pursue this path of violence. Thus, when two violently inclined individuals find themselves head to head in their pursuits of an apparent good, self-preservation dictates an act of defensive murder on both parts. Given that such circumstances arise, every person will have an equal and legitimate reason to assume that their neighbours are plotting their murder for their own self-gain and continued motion. Thus, our calculative faculty of reason will lead us to a sort of irrational rationality which puts forth the logical option of pre-emptive violence for our own preservation. Such a rationale is termed here as being irrational for the reason that it will definitely continue a cycle of violence which will ensure our own vulnerability to a greater degree.
Hobbes refers to our natural state of existence as a state of war. Even if some people may be content with a limited amount of power, it becomes reasonable for all people to engage in violent impositions due to the fact that some individuals are inclined to pursue power past their own preservation. Hobbes also cites glory as a motive contributing to the state of war, stemming from our desire to be recognized as powerful in our respective communities. The state of war which Hobbes describes is not to be mistaken as an everlasting bloody physical battle ensuing twenty four hours each day and seven days a week. Instead, he refers to a mode of existence which is characterized by a persistent looming fear and threat of violence attached to all of our activities. Further, the sate of war is a realm of existence within which all humans possess the natural right to use their own power however they please for their own preservation and continued motion. Hobbes asserts that, in this natural state of nature, freedom consists in the open and free movement of our capability to continue seeking power by any means suggested by our own individual reason. This is a paradoxical idea of freedom in which our 'free activities' will actually contribute toward our own insecurities through the building up of outside threats. Faced with this conundrum, our collective calculative reason will produce what Hobbes calls general laws of nature. These laws stem from our fundamental desire for self-preservation. The most important of these laws are: one, that we are always seeking peace and two, that we are liable to let go of our paradoxical freedoms toward the creation of peace only when others are inclined to do the same. Hobbes has very cleverly deduced a hypothetical state of natural relations which begs desperately for a way out. How can us self-seeking and perpetually power hungry creatures organize ourselves in order to ensure our own survival? Especially given the fact that: 'The force of words. . .[is] too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants.' Hobbes will answer this dilemma with his idea of the amoral absolute sovereign power.
Hobbes asserts that the only viable situation of mutual contract for every person’s self-preservation is one enforced by the security provided in a commonwealth lead by an absolute sovereign. His answer to the questions begged by our hypothetical state of nature will include the idea that '. . .covenants without the sword are but words. . .' The fundamental notion being expressed here is that a truly binding and obliging contract which represents our rational will for peace is enforceable only by means of fear. Hobbes’ legitimization of an amoral foundation of political power is expressed quite clearly in his attempt to define a truly 'moral' philosophy. What is moral is said to be rooted in a knowledge of the laws of nature. Since ideas of 'good' and 'evil' are relative words meant to signify our passions, their only objective value is realized in the universal desire of self-preservation. This will lead Hobbes to conclude that whatever shall serve the function of our preservation ought to be regarded as being 'good' whereas whatever seems to threaten our continued motion is by virtue of that fact 'evil.' This will become a justification for the absolute legislative power of a sovereign to direct the motion of the masses for their own 'good.' Moreover, notions which support the idea of a higher moral purpose attached to the essence of humans will be discredited as being dangerous to our preservation. Such ideas are regarded as being dangerous for the reason that they appear to undermine the overarching rule of an absolute sovereign in favour of private virtues. Stemming from an ontological framework which is confined to seeing humans as fixed axioms characterized by their relentless self-seeking motion, any faith in an individual’s developed moral virtues would be disastrous. Therefore, the only possible unity which can arise amongst such beings is established through the bonds of mutual fear created in a commonwealth.
The passion of fear is an essential quality of security for Hobbes because it alone forces people to sacrifice the paradoxical freedoms enjoyed in the state of nature. Hobbes describes two ways in which fear will lead to the creation of a commonwealth lead by a sovereign power. The commonwealth created by institution is one that arises as a result of the people voluntarily entering into a contract in order to consolidate power into the hands of a sovereign due to an unbearable fear of each other in the state of nature. The second and more common situation is the commonwealth which is established through acquisition - the sovereign power acquires rule over a body of people by virtue of violent force. Absolute power becomes legitimate in the second situation due to the population’s fear of the sovereign themself. In both cases, the submission of a population to an absolute power is the source of obligation for that population to follow all of the rules established by that power. The people must give up all of their natural freedoms. Hobbes justifies this type of absolute power by highlighting the continual fear accompanying humankind of slipping back into that state of nature which proves to be far worse than any despotic power could ever be. Hobbes asserts: '. . .of so unlimited a power men may fancy of many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse.' Therefore, the principle aim of political power according to Hobbes is to utilize the passion of fear in all humans in order to direct their motion in a manner which is most conducive to their security and preservation. The commonwealth is not an organic growth but rather a human construction through which our fake chains gain strength only with the real possibility of violent punishment. In an ultimate expression of materialism, Hobbes describes humans as the matter of a commonwealth of which the sovereign is the architect. There is no space provided within Hobbes’ scheme of thought to understand political organization as containing a moral objective which extends beyond the provision of security for mere life. Perhaps this position is the truly dangerous one when compared with a set of assumptions which allows us to see humans in their interdependence and higher potentials - an ontology of organicism. An oranicist ontological framework will be explained through an examination of its expression in the political philosophy of Aristotle. The notion of organic interdependence finds obvious expression in Aristotle’s teleological view of reality. Where all entities are interrelated, it is possible to notice things in their growth and development. Thus, some things can be regarded as instrumental goods in a long chain of interconnections moving toward goods which are an ends in themself. According to this scheme, reality can be viewed as containing elements of growth, purpose and the existence of an objective good. The objective good consists in the most self-sufficient ends of any given activity - it is the telos. Aristotle says, '. . .the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.' This organic conception of reality which imbues all things with purpose and growth will have significant implications for Aristotle’s understanding of the nature of human beings.
For Aristotle, the ends of all human activity is the objective good of 'happiness'- roughly translated from the word eudaemonia which implies a feeling of complete contentment and fulfillment. Eudaemonia is understood to be the highest good of our activities because it is a completely self-sufficient ends. It is a feeling to which we would undoubtably say 'stay.' For Aristotle, there is such a thing as a mind fully satisfied. This state of mind is reached only through the exorcize of our unique faculty of reason which allows us to access such universal truths. Aristotle defines the highest feeling of eudaemonia as being a result of the 'activity of soul in accordance with virtue. . .' The instinctual passions of the body discussed by Hobbes which lead us to endevour external and relativist goods are seen by Aristotle as merely instrumental means to our highest desire of the goods of the soul. This highly elusive sounding idea of the goods of the soul is described by Aristotle quite clearly in the following passage: 'You can see for yourselves that the happy life . . . belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul.' According to Aristotle, we are capable of developing universally valid virtues which can guide our desires in a fashion most conducive to the realization of a eudaemonic life. This conception of human nature stands in stark contrast with the Hobbesian notion of an innate and static human character whose faculty of reason serves only to calculate our instinctual passions. Likewise, Aristotle will produce a radically different idea of human relations.
Aristotle imagines three different modes of human relations or 'friendships' which may arise between individuals in society. It is important to note that Aristotle does not develop a hypothetical notion of our relations in a so called 'state of nature' like Hobbes. For Aristotle, the individual is a product of their social existence and is not conceivable outside of the organic growth of a society. Aristotle asserts that '. . .the whole is necessarily prior to the part.' This means that the individual gains their human character only within the whole of society. Therefore, our relations are constitutional of our development and growth. Aristotle defines a friendship as a reciprocal relation which is built upon one of the three goods of utility, pleasure or virtue. The truest and highest form of friendship is understood to be one based on a foundation of shared virtues. This type of relation will sustain time and will be based on a sense of goodwill which is an end in itself, as opposed to those relations which are instrumental and exploitative. Both individuals will recognize the other’s genuine striving toward the good and both will become the condition for the other’s capability to live a life filled with activities of goodness. Aristotle says, '. . .in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.' Therefore, human beings are capable of entering into relations which are productive of the highest good of eudaemonia as opposed to the Hobbesian view that we are always dangerous fetters to each others pursuits and physical existence. Thus, for Aristotle, political organization will be seen as containing the moral objective of providing individuals with the space to develop truly good relations and a life of goodness.
Aristotle’s moral conception of political order stems from his organicist ontological assumptions which lead him to see things in their organic interdependence and growth. The polis is regarded as a naturally evolving form of association which corresponds to our essence as potentially reasonable creatures. Aristotle asserts that '. . .while it [the polis] comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the sake of a good life.' The full development of the virtues associated with truly good activities presupposes an arena of rational deliberation which is provided by the state. Indeed, Aristotle agues that political association is a central tenant to our humanity because it alone allows us to exercise our unique faculty of reason. It allows us to reach our telos. Thus, the political arena is the highest and most self-sufficient ends of all our associations as human beings. From these premises regarding the nature of man and the function of political organization, we are presented with one of Aristotle’s most famous assertions that '. . .man is a political animal. . .' It is only through political activity that we are able to enact our higher potential of living the objective good life. Therefore, Aristotle prescribes a primarily moral function to human political orders - the ethical and the political are intimately linked. Aristotle asserts that the best constitution ought to ensure the best way of life. In other words, the primary concern of a state must center around the provision of individuals with the material and spiritual means to live a life of goodness. Since our happiness and fulfillment is gained through activities of virtue, the state is to be seen first and foremost as an agent of virtue. This is evident in Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of the state in providing proper education in order to train our reason and to 'cultivate the whole of excellence.' Aristotle’s ontological and political conceptions offer a moral alternative to Hobbes’ amoral system of an absolute sovereign conducting the motion of human matter.
There are important consequences involved in Aristotle’s political philosophy which also ought to be considered. It shall not be left off as though Aristotle presents a flawless and wholly moral philosophy. On the contrary, Aristotle’s teleological understanding of human association serves in many places as a justification for the oppressive institutions of slavery and patriarchy. Since all entities occupy a position in an interdependent growth, some forms of being are conceptually restricted to exist as the instrumental means for higher and more inclusive ends. This is exactly the case in terms of Aristotle’s support for human relations of dominance and exploitation. Since the polis is the highest ends of association, the household roles of slaves and women become regarded as a means for the good life of those few citizens who are privileged enough to take part in political affairs. Aristotle explains that an 'article of property is . . .an instrument for the purpose of life' and that '. . .the slave is an animate article of property. . .' Indeed, for Aristotle, an interconnected reality involves ruling and ruled entities in a teleological movement. By virtue of this fact, Aristotle will claim that the man is naturally superior to the woman. Somewhat like the slave, the wife occupies a subordinate role in the management of a household which is an instrumental association toward the development of a polis.
Although Aristotle’s moral politics paradoxically support a set of justifications for the immoral institutions of slavery and patriarchy, his key ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions can be sublated as a response to Hobbes’ scientific materialist authoritarianism. The fundamental ideas of organic interdependence and an objective and knowable good which is potentially realizable by human beings can be preserved as the basis of a truly moral politics. For instance, Aristotle’s idea of true friendship contains very progressive and democratic tendencies to which we can lend our focus. Indeed, if we recognize that the potential for activities of the soul in accordance with virtue exists within every human being, relations of domination and exploitation would be wholly negated in favour of those reciprocal relations of virtue which are productive of a eudaemonic existence. Instead of being meaningless bits of matter which ought to be manipulated through fear, humans can be regarded as dynamic and purposeful beings which ought to be organized in light of our higher essence - to live a '. . .life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in activities of goodness.'
References
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics http://www.classics.mit.edu/aristotle/nicomachean.1.i.html
Aristotle Politics
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
Asher Horowitz Political Science 2900 Lectures. York University
Ted Winslow Social Science 3552 Lectures. York University
Hobbes’ Leviathan contains a highly systematic and scientific treatment of human nature and human relations which serves to legitimize an amoral mode of political organization characterized by the rule of an absolute sovereign. Hobbes begins the Leviathan by setting forth an ontology of scientific materialism which will guide him in his method of investigation and, consequentially, in his assumptions concerning the nature of human beings. A scientific materialist ontological framework presupposes that all being consists of bits of atomic matter in constant motion. Therefore, human beings are understood by Hobbes to be complex, yet atomic, systems of matter in motion propelled by our appetites and aversions. This provides no room to conceive of interdependence, purposiveness or the existence of an objective good. Hobbes deduces a hypothetical picture of our state of nature from these assumed fundamental axioms of human character. He asserts that humans would be prone to pulverize each other, paradoxically stemming from our desire for self-preservation and continued motion.
Political organization, according to Hobbes, must be primarily concerned with the preservation of our species by way of protecting all self-seeking individuals from their self-seeking neighbours. This requires an absolute sovereign who represents force and violence in order to direct the continued motion of the masses for their own protection. Notions of higher human potential and essence which may provide a basis for a moral conception of political organizagtion are not only excluded from this particular ontological framework, Hobbes addresses them as being absurd and even dangerous to our continued existence. In this paper, the influence of Hobbes’ ontology on his ideas of human being and political power will be critically explored in light of the view that our political organization ought to have a moral basis. Hobbes’ underlying assumptions will be contrasted with a radically different set of assumptions derivable from an alternative ontology of organicism - the notion of organic interdependence. An organicist ontology will be represented through some key ideas in the ancient political philosophy of Aristotle which treat human beings as potentially capable of living a eudaemonic life through the developed capabilities and virtues made possible by our faculty of reason. Political organization can be regarded here as having the moral objective of allowing humans to actualize the good life. Important problems with Aristotle’s method will also be brought to light and considered. However, the main ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions put forth by Aristotle will be presented as a positive alternative to the authoritarian and amoral conclusions of Hobbes.
It makes most sense to begin by elucidating the central tenants and implications of a scientific materialist ontology through an examination of Hobbes’ methodology and other early evidence of his ontological assumptions. Hobbes relies on the investigative model of geometry in his exploration into human relations. This style of mathematical investigation favours axiomatic deductive reasoning. Thus, when applied to human phenomena, this method implicitly suggests that all living reality contains a static character which is deducible and calculable as such. Indeed, for Hobbes, the only thing that exists to be taken into scientific account is a relative and subjective concrete material reality. Notions of 'good' and 'bad' or 'true' and 'false' are only the result of names which we ascribe to our outside reality. There is no inherent and objective truth or goodness contained in the universe. Thus, the truth which we are given through geometry rests upon the proper use and calculation of names which adequately represent material reality. Universality is only a characteristic of agreed definitions which register similarity between things in our material world. Artificially constructed language is a tool capable of removing ourselves from immediacy in order to gain recognition of universals. Beyond this, there is no truth and, consequently, there is no purposiveness in the movement of life. So far, this ontological scheme has been shown to view all reality as being made up of bits of matter with no room for ideas concerning 'essence' or 'purpose.' Indeed, Hobbes explicitly addressees such notions as being grounded in absurdity. Such absurdity is said to stem from the use of what he calls 'senseless speech.' That is, words that do not represent concrete material phenomena, such as the idea of a 'free will' which implies a freedom outside of its negative sense as unhindered motion. Hobbes attacks Aristotelean philosophy for the use of absurd speech which wrongfully signifies entities or forces which exist outside of our material reality.
For Hobbes, reality consists of nothing other than matter in motion. He describes a very mechanical conception of the human being in which '. . .life is but a motion of limbs.' Here we arrive at another key tenant of a scientific materialist ontology - external relations. External relations implies that the character of a given entity remains separate and non-dependent from its relations with other isolated bodies. Hobbes goes on in the same passage to describe the human heart as a spring, our nerves as strings and so on. There is no conception of interdependence through which we can picture the heart as being a heart in virtue of its relation to the nerves and vice versa. Thus, Hobbes describes political systems as being artificially created as opposed to attributing their existence to an organic growth resulting from an interdependence of factors in a living universe. Thus, the ontological framework of scientific materialism accepted by Hobbes conceives reality as constituted by isolated bits of moving matter in external relations with no higher good or interdependence. This has an important influence on his conception of the nature of human beings.Following the conception of reality set forth by a scientific materialist ontology, human beings are conceived by Hobbes to be nothing more than intricate and mechanical systems of matter in motion. Human beings are supposedly governed by a law of eternal motion which applies to all physical reality. Hobbes raises a picture in our minds of those familiar rolling waves which move across a body of water long after their principal source of motion (the wind) has died out. He then goes on to compare this evidence of continued motion with the internal motions which take place inside humans. Hobbes describes these internal motions as beginning with the operation of the senses in relation to the external world of objects and culminating in our voluntary motion. The process begins when our immediate senses become manifest as imagination or memory - sense which has 'decayed.' Such imagination will form our general desires and endeavours, expressed in the form of appetites and aversions. For Hobbes, this marks the origin of human emotions. Those things we are said to 'love' or 'hate' are simply expressions of our relative appetites or aversions which stem from our sensory experiences and the motions of imagination. Hobbes’ scheme of thought leaves no room to conceive of emotions as feelings which are consistent with our proximity to an objective good in our activities.
For Hobbes, our faculty of reason is regarded as a calculative device which is governed by the demands of our passions and desires. Hobbes speaks of reason as an acquired wit which is developed by our passions, namely the desire for power. Power, Hobbes says, is the '. . . present means to obtain some future apparent good. . .' Essentially, humans are liable to exercise their calculative faculty of reason when motivated by subjective desires created by their random mechanical interactions with other bits of matter in motion. Hobbes explains: '. . . thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and find the way to things desired . . .' The final stage of internal motion before the emergence of voluntary action is the culmination of a will. The human will is produced after one takes part in a process of deliberation which narrows down and restricts all of the different options produced by our desires. Hobbes concludes from this mechanical view of humankind that the happiness and well being of any given human depends on their relative capability to satisfy all of their different desires through rational deliberation. He continues to explicitly denounce the notion of a mind completely contented. This type of satisfaction of our desires would bring an end to our continued motion which, for Hobbes, would imply an absence of life all together. Therefore, there is no room for the idea of objectively good activities which are an end in themselves. Our voluntary motions are such that they seek an endless movement from one instrumental good to the next. Further, we seek not only immediate pleasure but are largely driven by a view to the future which urges us to ensure our continual pleasure through the fulfillment of our appetites. From these premises Hobbes will claim that the human character is marked by '. . . a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.' This picture of the nature of human individuals has enormous implications for Hobbes’ conception of the types of relations which are 'natural' among human beings. This will be expressed in his idea of a hypothetical state of nature.
Following his scientific method of investigation, Hobbes has broken down the various elements of human life into fixed and calculable axioms. A notion of our state of nature is deduced from these assumed axioms pertaining to our innate character. How would these complex human 'atoms' interact without what Hobbes views as the artificial construct of political power and civil society? According to Hobbes, if all self-seeking individuals are continually moved by a desire for 'power after power' with no complete satisfaction available, we would eventually be prone to engage in competitive relations in order to ensure our own future pleasures. Therefore, individuals will become inclined to wish dominance over other human beings and this will find its ultimate expression in the act of murder. An individual’s power is seen by Hobbes to be entirely relative to the power of others. There is no room to conceive of an interdependence of power where my abilities are the precondition for your abilities. Instead, Hobbes paints a picture of violent atomic clashes taking place between human beings. Further, since we are all equally endowed with the means to take another persons life, we all necessarily become equally inclined to pursue this path of violence. Thus, when two violently inclined individuals find themselves head to head in their pursuits of an apparent good, self-preservation dictates an act of defensive murder on both parts. Given that such circumstances arise, every person will have an equal and legitimate reason to assume that their neighbours are plotting their murder for their own self-gain and continued motion. Thus, our calculative faculty of reason will lead us to a sort of irrational rationality which puts forth the logical option of pre-emptive violence for our own preservation. Such a rationale is termed here as being irrational for the reason that it will definitely continue a cycle of violence which will ensure our own vulnerability to a greater degree.
Hobbes refers to our natural state of existence as a state of war. Even if some people may be content with a limited amount of power, it becomes reasonable for all people to engage in violent impositions due to the fact that some individuals are inclined to pursue power past their own preservation. Hobbes also cites glory as a motive contributing to the state of war, stemming from our desire to be recognized as powerful in our respective communities. The state of war which Hobbes describes is not to be mistaken as an everlasting bloody physical battle ensuing twenty four hours each day and seven days a week. Instead, he refers to a mode of existence which is characterized by a persistent looming fear and threat of violence attached to all of our activities. Further, the sate of war is a realm of existence within which all humans possess the natural right to use their own power however they please for their own preservation and continued motion. Hobbes asserts that, in this natural state of nature, freedom consists in the open and free movement of our capability to continue seeking power by any means suggested by our own individual reason. This is a paradoxical idea of freedom in which our 'free activities' will actually contribute toward our own insecurities through the building up of outside threats. Faced with this conundrum, our collective calculative reason will produce what Hobbes calls general laws of nature. These laws stem from our fundamental desire for self-preservation. The most important of these laws are: one, that we are always seeking peace and two, that we are liable to let go of our paradoxical freedoms toward the creation of peace only when others are inclined to do the same. Hobbes has very cleverly deduced a hypothetical state of natural relations which begs desperately for a way out. How can us self-seeking and perpetually power hungry creatures organize ourselves in order to ensure our own survival? Especially given the fact that: 'The force of words. . .[is] too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants.' Hobbes will answer this dilemma with his idea of the amoral absolute sovereign power.
Hobbes asserts that the only viable situation of mutual contract for every person’s self-preservation is one enforced by the security provided in a commonwealth lead by an absolute sovereign. His answer to the questions begged by our hypothetical state of nature will include the idea that '. . .covenants without the sword are but words. . .' The fundamental notion being expressed here is that a truly binding and obliging contract which represents our rational will for peace is enforceable only by means of fear. Hobbes’ legitimization of an amoral foundation of political power is expressed quite clearly in his attempt to define a truly 'moral' philosophy. What is moral is said to be rooted in a knowledge of the laws of nature. Since ideas of 'good' and 'evil' are relative words meant to signify our passions, their only objective value is realized in the universal desire of self-preservation. This will lead Hobbes to conclude that whatever shall serve the function of our preservation ought to be regarded as being 'good' whereas whatever seems to threaten our continued motion is by virtue of that fact 'evil.' This will become a justification for the absolute legislative power of a sovereign to direct the motion of the masses for their own 'good.' Moreover, notions which support the idea of a higher moral purpose attached to the essence of humans will be discredited as being dangerous to our preservation. Such ideas are regarded as being dangerous for the reason that they appear to undermine the overarching rule of an absolute sovereign in favour of private virtues. Stemming from an ontological framework which is confined to seeing humans as fixed axioms characterized by their relentless self-seeking motion, any faith in an individual’s developed moral virtues would be disastrous. Therefore, the only possible unity which can arise amongst such beings is established through the bonds of mutual fear created in a commonwealth.
The passion of fear is an essential quality of security for Hobbes because it alone forces people to sacrifice the paradoxical freedoms enjoyed in the state of nature. Hobbes describes two ways in which fear will lead to the creation of a commonwealth lead by a sovereign power. The commonwealth created by institution is one that arises as a result of the people voluntarily entering into a contract in order to consolidate power into the hands of a sovereign due to an unbearable fear of each other in the state of nature. The second and more common situation is the commonwealth which is established through acquisition - the sovereign power acquires rule over a body of people by virtue of violent force. Absolute power becomes legitimate in the second situation due to the population’s fear of the sovereign themself. In both cases, the submission of a population to an absolute power is the source of obligation for that population to follow all of the rules established by that power. The people must give up all of their natural freedoms. Hobbes justifies this type of absolute power by highlighting the continual fear accompanying humankind of slipping back into that state of nature which proves to be far worse than any despotic power could ever be. Hobbes asserts: '. . .of so unlimited a power men may fancy of many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse.' Therefore, the principle aim of political power according to Hobbes is to utilize the passion of fear in all humans in order to direct their motion in a manner which is most conducive to their security and preservation. The commonwealth is not an organic growth but rather a human construction through which our fake chains gain strength only with the real possibility of violent punishment. In an ultimate expression of materialism, Hobbes describes humans as the matter of a commonwealth of which the sovereign is the architect. There is no space provided within Hobbes’ scheme of thought to understand political organization as containing a moral objective which extends beyond the provision of security for mere life. Perhaps this position is the truly dangerous one when compared with a set of assumptions which allows us to see humans in their interdependence and higher potentials - an ontology of organicism. An oranicist ontological framework will be explained through an examination of its expression in the political philosophy of Aristotle. The notion of organic interdependence finds obvious expression in Aristotle’s teleological view of reality. Where all entities are interrelated, it is possible to notice things in their growth and development. Thus, some things can be regarded as instrumental goods in a long chain of interconnections moving toward goods which are an ends in themself. According to this scheme, reality can be viewed as containing elements of growth, purpose and the existence of an objective good. The objective good consists in the most self-sufficient ends of any given activity - it is the telos. Aristotle says, '. . .the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.' This organic conception of reality which imbues all things with purpose and growth will have significant implications for Aristotle’s understanding of the nature of human beings.
For Aristotle, the ends of all human activity is the objective good of 'happiness'- roughly translated from the word eudaemonia which implies a feeling of complete contentment and fulfillment. Eudaemonia is understood to be the highest good of our activities because it is a completely self-sufficient ends. It is a feeling to which we would undoubtably say 'stay.' For Aristotle, there is such a thing as a mind fully satisfied. This state of mind is reached only through the exorcize of our unique faculty of reason which allows us to access such universal truths. Aristotle defines the highest feeling of eudaemonia as being a result of the 'activity of soul in accordance with virtue. . .' The instinctual passions of the body discussed by Hobbes which lead us to endevour external and relativist goods are seen by Aristotle as merely instrumental means to our highest desire of the goods of the soul. This highly elusive sounding idea of the goods of the soul is described by Aristotle quite clearly in the following passage: 'You can see for yourselves that the happy life . . . belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul.' According to Aristotle, we are capable of developing universally valid virtues which can guide our desires in a fashion most conducive to the realization of a eudaemonic life. This conception of human nature stands in stark contrast with the Hobbesian notion of an innate and static human character whose faculty of reason serves only to calculate our instinctual passions. Likewise, Aristotle will produce a radically different idea of human relations.
Aristotle imagines three different modes of human relations or 'friendships' which may arise between individuals in society. It is important to note that Aristotle does not develop a hypothetical notion of our relations in a so called 'state of nature' like Hobbes. For Aristotle, the individual is a product of their social existence and is not conceivable outside of the organic growth of a society. Aristotle asserts that '. . .the whole is necessarily prior to the part.' This means that the individual gains their human character only within the whole of society. Therefore, our relations are constitutional of our development and growth. Aristotle defines a friendship as a reciprocal relation which is built upon one of the three goods of utility, pleasure or virtue. The truest and highest form of friendship is understood to be one based on a foundation of shared virtues. This type of relation will sustain time and will be based on a sense of goodwill which is an end in itself, as opposed to those relations which are instrumental and exploitative. Both individuals will recognize the other’s genuine striving toward the good and both will become the condition for the other’s capability to live a life filled with activities of goodness. Aristotle says, '. . .in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.' Therefore, human beings are capable of entering into relations which are productive of the highest good of eudaemonia as opposed to the Hobbesian view that we are always dangerous fetters to each others pursuits and physical existence. Thus, for Aristotle, political organization will be seen as containing the moral objective of providing individuals with the space to develop truly good relations and a life of goodness.
Aristotle’s moral conception of political order stems from his organicist ontological assumptions which lead him to see things in their organic interdependence and growth. The polis is regarded as a naturally evolving form of association which corresponds to our essence as potentially reasonable creatures. Aristotle asserts that '. . .while it [the polis] comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the sake of a good life.' The full development of the virtues associated with truly good activities presupposes an arena of rational deliberation which is provided by the state. Indeed, Aristotle agues that political association is a central tenant to our humanity because it alone allows us to exercise our unique faculty of reason. It allows us to reach our telos. Thus, the political arena is the highest and most self-sufficient ends of all our associations as human beings. From these premises regarding the nature of man and the function of political organization, we are presented with one of Aristotle’s most famous assertions that '. . .man is a political animal. . .' It is only through political activity that we are able to enact our higher potential of living the objective good life. Therefore, Aristotle prescribes a primarily moral function to human political orders - the ethical and the political are intimately linked. Aristotle asserts that the best constitution ought to ensure the best way of life. In other words, the primary concern of a state must center around the provision of individuals with the material and spiritual means to live a life of goodness. Since our happiness and fulfillment is gained through activities of virtue, the state is to be seen first and foremost as an agent of virtue. This is evident in Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of the state in providing proper education in order to train our reason and to 'cultivate the whole of excellence.' Aristotle’s ontological and political conceptions offer a moral alternative to Hobbes’ amoral system of an absolute sovereign conducting the motion of human matter.
There are important consequences involved in Aristotle’s political philosophy which also ought to be considered. It shall not be left off as though Aristotle presents a flawless and wholly moral philosophy. On the contrary, Aristotle’s teleological understanding of human association serves in many places as a justification for the oppressive institutions of slavery and patriarchy. Since all entities occupy a position in an interdependent growth, some forms of being are conceptually restricted to exist as the instrumental means for higher and more inclusive ends. This is exactly the case in terms of Aristotle’s support for human relations of dominance and exploitation. Since the polis is the highest ends of association, the household roles of slaves and women become regarded as a means for the good life of those few citizens who are privileged enough to take part in political affairs. Aristotle explains that an 'article of property is . . .an instrument for the purpose of life' and that '. . .the slave is an animate article of property. . .' Indeed, for Aristotle, an interconnected reality involves ruling and ruled entities in a teleological movement. By virtue of this fact, Aristotle will claim that the man is naturally superior to the woman. Somewhat like the slave, the wife occupies a subordinate role in the management of a household which is an instrumental association toward the development of a polis.
Although Aristotle’s moral politics paradoxically support a set of justifications for the immoral institutions of slavery and patriarchy, his key ontological and philosophic anthropological assumptions can be sublated as a response to Hobbes’ scientific materialist authoritarianism. The fundamental ideas of organic interdependence and an objective and knowable good which is potentially realizable by human beings can be preserved as the basis of a truly moral politics. For instance, Aristotle’s idea of true friendship contains very progressive and democratic tendencies to which we can lend our focus. Indeed, if we recognize that the potential for activities of the soul in accordance with virtue exists within every human being, relations of domination and exploitation would be wholly negated in favour of those reciprocal relations of virtue which are productive of a eudaemonic existence. Instead of being meaningless bits of matter which ought to be manipulated through fear, humans can be regarded as dynamic and purposeful beings which ought to be organized in light of our higher essence - to live a '. . .life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in activities of goodness.'
References
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics http://www.classics.mit.edu/aristotle/nicomachean.1.i.html
Aristotle Politics
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
Asher Horowitz Political Science 2900 Lectures. York University
Ted Winslow Social Science 3552 Lectures. York University
Friday, February 29, 2008
Historical Development and Moral Political Economy
The following is a short inquiry and exploration into the topic of human development and the connected possibilities of a truly moral political/economic structure. "Moral" here implies a certain conception of the nature of human beings as potentially rational beings capable of leading a life filled with fully free and fulfilling activities presupposing their full development. What proceeds is an account of human development put forth in the philosophy of Karl Marx with particular attention paid to the ontological framework which he adopts. In the introduction I use the phrase "ancient linage" to describe the roots of these ontological assumptions. By this I am referring to the ancient Greek tradition of thought and in particular to the works of Aristotle who Marx hailed as "the greatest thinker of antiquity."
Marx conceives political economy as a moral science which contains the primary concern of providing individuals with the requirements necessary in order to live the objective good life. The ideas expounded by Marx in his conception of political economy as a moral science have an ancient lineage and can be shown as having their roots in a particular set of ontological assumptions known as organicism. An organicist ontology conceives being as constituted by activities in internal relations. The philosophic anthropological implications of an ontology of organicism allows room for the elements of self-determination and final causation to be applied to human activity. Human being is regarded as a potentially rational being. This can be seen in Marx’s ability to view the individual as an active agent capable of enacting their potential as a fully rational and therefore free being through an historical process of education. For Marx, this process of the development of human reason takes place within our economic structure, which constitutes what he refers to as the base. Marx asserts that the base is the prime source of our development and so it directly effects the types of relations which will characterize what he terms as the superstructure. The term superstructure is used by Marx to describe the larger structure of society and its institutions (politics, religion, art, etc). In this essay, an examination of the main tenants of organicism and its philosophic anthropological implications will provide the basis for an examination of Marx’s emphasis on the base as the main stage of human relations and development. This will provide the background necessary to elaborate exactly how, for Marx, individuals can come to know and actualize the good life in a fully free superstructure.
According to an organicist ontology, the given character of any being is formed by its active appropriation of those things which it is related to. In terms of understanding the nature of human being, this is expressed by Marx in the following way: "In its reality it (the essence of man) is the ensemble of social relationships." Human character is not treated as something innate and unchangeable. Instead, an individual’s character is regarded as the outcome of the particular relations in which that individual is embedded. From this position we are able to view human actions as potentially self-determined. The scope of self-determined activity is indeed conditioned and somewhat limited by the set of relations which form the individual’s essence. Nevertheless, according to this scheme, actions are far from being pre-determined by some concrete set of relations. The relations which condition actions are themselves subject to change throughout history as the result of human activity. Moreover, according to the set of philosophic anthropological assumptions which derive from organicism, human being is understood as a potentially rational being. This expresses the possibility of a self-determination being grounded in reason, which would result in wholly rational and truly good actions. Indeed, such claims presuppose the existence of an objective and rational good as a final cause. For Marx, the objective good is detailed in his notion of the true realm of freedom which we will explore later. For now, what is most important is the conception of human being as, in one sense, the result of internal relations and in another sense a potentially rational being who is capable of knowing and actualizing the good life. Marx envisions an historical process of education and development toward the creation of ideal relations which provide what Alfred Whitehead refers to as the real potentiality for actualizing the good. However, before we consider this process of development, it is necessary to first explore the principle source of this development - the base.
For Marx, the base encompasses both relations and forces of production. Humans are regarded as natural producers owing to the fact that activity within the realm of necessity provides us with the essential means of life itself. Therefore, the relations which arise from the activities of production and exchange are primal and unavoidable. Moreover, the act of production is regarded as an objectification of mind. In this sense, the forces of production are reflective of the development of reason. From this position we can reach the conclusion that the very essence of human being, which we now know is measured by our level of rationality, is determined by our relations within the base. Relations of production are intimately connected with the development of reason and can be seen as a gage for the level of freedom or rationality which exists. Kosik expresses Marx’s conception of the base as the main stage of the development of human essence in the following words: ". . .economics appears as the conjunction of human relations and the source of human reality." This puts forth the implicit suggestion that the relations which characterize the base directly effect the level of rationality in the superstructure. Forces and relations of production do not only provide the material necessities of life but are also directly developmental of human reason.
It is important to emphasize that, for Marx, the base is nothing other than a human creation itself. In other words, his emphasis on the base as a center of human development does not amount to an economic determinist position. Internal relations at the base merely condition the scope of an individuals self-determined actions. It is only through human activity that relations are transformed and new conditions are created which can be closer to our ends of freedom. The progression toward relations of freedom, which are central to Marx’s notion of the objective good, is understood as an interdependent movement of freedom and reason. The true realm of freedom would be a superstructure comprised of fully reasonable and rational individuals who posses the developed capabilities necessary to share in good activities. Such activities would provide the content for relations of mutual recognition and freedom.
Marx’s notion of the objective good paints a clear picture of the correlation between reason and freedom. The next step will be to explain exactly how, for Marx, the progressive development of reason and relations takes place.
Marx envisions an historical process of education taking place within the base which unfolds in stages as part of a dialectic. The capitalist system of production is conceived by Marx as being the final stage in a dialectical movement toward the true realm of freedom. Relations within the capitalist mode of production are presented as being antithetical to the actualization of the individual’s essence as a potentially rational being. This means that instead of being characterized by actions which have a rational basis, the capitalist character is primarily dominated by irrational motives. Marx’s notion of irrational motivation appropriates Hegel’s idea of the passions. The passions are described by Hegel as self-interested and un-fulfilling motives which are the outcome of less than rational relations. Marx details his notion of the capitalist passions as consisting of an irrational desire for the instrumental good of money as an ends - greed. This mistaken pursuit of an instrumental good as an ends is not founded on knowledge of the rational objective good and therefore it fosters relations which are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Paradoxically, the development of reason which would negate these irrational capitalist relations is understood by Marx as a result of those relations themselves. Marx appropriates this notion of a dialectical development of freedom from Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relation. Hegel suggests that the relation of domination and submission between master and slave is positively developmental for the slave.
"The complete, absolutely free man, . . . completely satisfied by what he is . . . will be the Slave who has overcome slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress"
For Hegel, the slave is able to form, through their labour, a higher state of consciousness and reason involving a view to the future. Where the master is only capable of enjoying the goods of the slave’s production subjectively, the slave undergoes a development of reason through which they are able to conceive an objective good. Likewise, Marx regards the irrational relations of capitalist production as capable of developing a consciousness in the mind of the worker which brings them closer to rationality and the ability to act in accordance with an objective good. Thus, the worker as a subject of irrational capitalist motives develops the capabilities necessary to end their subjection. Such fully developed individuals would be capable of enacting their potential as rational free beings and would therefore live within the ideal relations of freedom constitutive of a fully free superstructure. Marx asserts that a society of fully rational individuals would bring the realm of necessity under their own collective control in order to reduce the hours spent working within it and to maximize the amount of time spent acting within the realm of freedom.
In this paper, Marx’s notion of the base-superstructure relation has been presented in light of the organicist ontology from which his moral political economy derives. These ideas have been expounded in quite general terms when considered in relation to the extensive possibilities of inquiry on the subject. Therefore, it would be rather naive to present a definite conclusion to the concepts discussed so far. Instead, it seems most appropriate to put forth the next possible area of inquiry which may arise from considering the ideas presented in this paper. For instance, the question can be legitimately posed as to why we are still stuck within a form of capitalist organization despite Marx’s assertion that early capitalist relations were a mere gradation in a progressive movement toward freedom. This question leads us to consider the ontology dominant in our modern times, which is one of atomism. According to the atomist scheme of thought, there is no room for self-determination or the existence of an objective good. Perhaps these ontological assumptions ought to be reevaluated.
References
Ted Winslow. Marx on the Relation between "Justice", "Freedom" and "Capabilities"
Ted Winslow. Atomism and Organicism
Ted Winslow. Ontology and Political Economy
Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1969)
Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach
Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
Marx conceives political economy as a moral science which contains the primary concern of providing individuals with the requirements necessary in order to live the objective good life. The ideas expounded by Marx in his conception of political economy as a moral science have an ancient lineage and can be shown as having their roots in a particular set of ontological assumptions known as organicism. An organicist ontology conceives being as constituted by activities in internal relations. The philosophic anthropological implications of an ontology of organicism allows room for the elements of self-determination and final causation to be applied to human activity. Human being is regarded as a potentially rational being. This can be seen in Marx’s ability to view the individual as an active agent capable of enacting their potential as a fully rational and therefore free being through an historical process of education. For Marx, this process of the development of human reason takes place within our economic structure, which constitutes what he refers to as the base. Marx asserts that the base is the prime source of our development and so it directly effects the types of relations which will characterize what he terms as the superstructure. The term superstructure is used by Marx to describe the larger structure of society and its institutions (politics, religion, art, etc). In this essay, an examination of the main tenants of organicism and its philosophic anthropological implications will provide the basis for an examination of Marx’s emphasis on the base as the main stage of human relations and development. This will provide the background necessary to elaborate exactly how, for Marx, individuals can come to know and actualize the good life in a fully free superstructure.
According to an organicist ontology, the given character of any being is formed by its active appropriation of those things which it is related to. In terms of understanding the nature of human being, this is expressed by Marx in the following way: "In its reality it (the essence of man) is the ensemble of social relationships." Human character is not treated as something innate and unchangeable. Instead, an individual’s character is regarded as the outcome of the particular relations in which that individual is embedded. From this position we are able to view human actions as potentially self-determined. The scope of self-determined activity is indeed conditioned and somewhat limited by the set of relations which form the individual’s essence. Nevertheless, according to this scheme, actions are far from being pre-determined by some concrete set of relations. The relations which condition actions are themselves subject to change throughout history as the result of human activity. Moreover, according to the set of philosophic anthropological assumptions which derive from organicism, human being is understood as a potentially rational being. This expresses the possibility of a self-determination being grounded in reason, which would result in wholly rational and truly good actions. Indeed, such claims presuppose the existence of an objective and rational good as a final cause. For Marx, the objective good is detailed in his notion of the true realm of freedom which we will explore later. For now, what is most important is the conception of human being as, in one sense, the result of internal relations and in another sense a potentially rational being who is capable of knowing and actualizing the good life. Marx envisions an historical process of education and development toward the creation of ideal relations which provide what Alfred Whitehead refers to as the real potentiality for actualizing the good. However, before we consider this process of development, it is necessary to first explore the principle source of this development - the base.
For Marx, the base encompasses both relations and forces of production. Humans are regarded as natural producers owing to the fact that activity within the realm of necessity provides us with the essential means of life itself. Therefore, the relations which arise from the activities of production and exchange are primal and unavoidable. Moreover, the act of production is regarded as an objectification of mind. In this sense, the forces of production are reflective of the development of reason. From this position we can reach the conclusion that the very essence of human being, which we now know is measured by our level of rationality, is determined by our relations within the base. Relations of production are intimately connected with the development of reason and can be seen as a gage for the level of freedom or rationality which exists. Kosik expresses Marx’s conception of the base as the main stage of the development of human essence in the following words: ". . .economics appears as the conjunction of human relations and the source of human reality." This puts forth the implicit suggestion that the relations which characterize the base directly effect the level of rationality in the superstructure. Forces and relations of production do not only provide the material necessities of life but are also directly developmental of human reason.
It is important to emphasize that, for Marx, the base is nothing other than a human creation itself. In other words, his emphasis on the base as a center of human development does not amount to an economic determinist position. Internal relations at the base merely condition the scope of an individuals self-determined actions. It is only through human activity that relations are transformed and new conditions are created which can be closer to our ends of freedom. The progression toward relations of freedom, which are central to Marx’s notion of the objective good, is understood as an interdependent movement of freedom and reason. The true realm of freedom would be a superstructure comprised of fully reasonable and rational individuals who posses the developed capabilities necessary to share in good activities. Such activities would provide the content for relations of mutual recognition and freedom.
Marx’s notion of the objective good paints a clear picture of the correlation between reason and freedom. The next step will be to explain exactly how, for Marx, the progressive development of reason and relations takes place.
Marx envisions an historical process of education taking place within the base which unfolds in stages as part of a dialectic. The capitalist system of production is conceived by Marx as being the final stage in a dialectical movement toward the true realm of freedom. Relations within the capitalist mode of production are presented as being antithetical to the actualization of the individual’s essence as a potentially rational being. This means that instead of being characterized by actions which have a rational basis, the capitalist character is primarily dominated by irrational motives. Marx’s notion of irrational motivation appropriates Hegel’s idea of the passions. The passions are described by Hegel as self-interested and un-fulfilling motives which are the outcome of less than rational relations. Marx details his notion of the capitalist passions as consisting of an irrational desire for the instrumental good of money as an ends - greed. This mistaken pursuit of an instrumental good as an ends is not founded on knowledge of the rational objective good and therefore it fosters relations which are antithetical to our essence as potentially rational beings. Paradoxically, the development of reason which would negate these irrational capitalist relations is understood by Marx as a result of those relations themselves. Marx appropriates this notion of a dialectical development of freedom from Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relation. Hegel suggests that the relation of domination and submission between master and slave is positively developmental for the slave.
"The complete, absolutely free man, . . . completely satisfied by what he is . . . will be the Slave who has overcome slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress"
For Hegel, the slave is able to form, through their labour, a higher state of consciousness and reason involving a view to the future. Where the master is only capable of enjoying the goods of the slave’s production subjectively, the slave undergoes a development of reason through which they are able to conceive an objective good. Likewise, Marx regards the irrational relations of capitalist production as capable of developing a consciousness in the mind of the worker which brings them closer to rationality and the ability to act in accordance with an objective good. Thus, the worker as a subject of irrational capitalist motives develops the capabilities necessary to end their subjection. Such fully developed individuals would be capable of enacting their potential as rational free beings and would therefore live within the ideal relations of freedom constitutive of a fully free superstructure. Marx asserts that a society of fully rational individuals would bring the realm of necessity under their own collective control in order to reduce the hours spent working within it and to maximize the amount of time spent acting within the realm of freedom.
In this paper, Marx’s notion of the base-superstructure relation has been presented in light of the organicist ontology from which his moral political economy derives. These ideas have been expounded in quite general terms when considered in relation to the extensive possibilities of inquiry on the subject. Therefore, it would be rather naive to present a definite conclusion to the concepts discussed so far. Instead, it seems most appropriate to put forth the next possible area of inquiry which may arise from considering the ideas presented in this paper. For instance, the question can be legitimately posed as to why we are still stuck within a form of capitalist organization despite Marx’s assertion that early capitalist relations were a mere gradation in a progressive movement toward freedom. This question leads us to consider the ontology dominant in our modern times, which is one of atomism. According to the atomist scheme of thought, there is no room for self-determination or the existence of an objective good. Perhaps these ontological assumptions ought to be reevaluated.
References
Ted Winslow. Marx on the Relation between "Justice", "Freedom" and "Capabilities"
Ted Winslow. Atomism and Organicism
Ted Winslow. Ontology and Political Economy
Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1969)
Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach
Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Purpose
First post. First blog.
I suppose it makes sense to begin with a short explanation of my blogspot name. This will be most fitting because a) it is a somewhat unique title to choose to which there is an ancient and philosophical background and b) because it will be an underlying theme running through all of my posts.
Minerva is the name of an ancient Roman goddess of wisdom. She was accompanied in her journeys by and Owl which consequently represents wisdom or the spirit from which the endeavour of philosophy (translated from Greek to mean 'love of wisdom) takes flight.
The 19th Century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel makes reference to the Owl of Minerva in his 'Preface to The Philosophy of Right.' Hegel says: "The Owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk" By this he means that the culminating wisdom of an historical epoch is gained in hindsight - at dusk - before a new epoch arises.
In a sense, my posts will generally follow the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom in line with the spirit suggested by the flight of Minerva's Owl. However, it will be a pursuit accompanied by high hopes that we may gain a clue as to how we ought to conduct ourselves as human beings in a manner most conducive to our highest potentials today. Perhaps, the flight of enlightenment and truth may one day take off and soar before our eyes - before dusk.
Let us take an adventure into the realm of ideas, willing always that they may also become manifest as progressive actions.
I suppose it makes sense to begin with a short explanation of my blogspot name. This will be most fitting because a) it is a somewhat unique title to choose to which there is an ancient and philosophical background and b) because it will be an underlying theme running through all of my posts.
Minerva is the name of an ancient Roman goddess of wisdom. She was accompanied in her journeys by and Owl which consequently represents wisdom or the spirit from which the endeavour of philosophy (translated from Greek to mean 'love of wisdom) takes flight.
The 19th Century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel makes reference to the Owl of Minerva in his 'Preface to The Philosophy of Right.' Hegel says: "The Owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk" By this he means that the culminating wisdom of an historical epoch is gained in hindsight - at dusk - before a new epoch arises.
In a sense, my posts will generally follow the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom in line with the spirit suggested by the flight of Minerva's Owl. However, it will be a pursuit accompanied by high hopes that we may gain a clue as to how we ought to conduct ourselves as human beings in a manner most conducive to our highest potentials today. Perhaps, the flight of enlightenment and truth may one day take off and soar before our eyes - before dusk.
Let us take an adventure into the realm of ideas, willing always that they may also become manifest as progressive actions.
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